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I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Supreme Court's decision in eBay v. MercExchange, LLC 1 a
finding of patent infringement almost always meant that the defendant would be
enjoined from future infringement. 2 The Federal Circuit operated under a "'gen-
eral rule,' unique to patent disputes, 'that a permanent injunction will issue once
infringement and validity have been adjudged.' 3 In eBay, the Supreme Court
changed this landscape by delineating a "traditional four-factor framework" un-
der which to evaluate the propriety of injunctive relief.'
In the wake of eBay, many courts have declined to enjoin the defendant's
infringement, instead awarding ongoing royalties, which require that the defend-
ant pay a specified royalty for each future act of infringement. 5 Unfortunately,
courts have yet to develop a unifying theory to properly quantify this new rem-
edy. Some courts have awarded supracompensatory ongoing royalties, either on
the theory that any ongoing infringement is necessarily willful and calls for an
enhanced award,6 or on the proposition that the jury's verdict of infringement
and validity would strengthen the patentee's bargaining position relative to the
infringer.7 Other courts, however, have awarded ongoing royalties at the jury
rate.
8
In this article, I suggest that ongoing royalty enhancements are improper
in most cases. To set up this argument, I identify the primary reasons for denying
injunctions in post-eBay patent cases as the same reasons that courts have denied
injunctions in traditional property contexts.
547 U.S. 388 (2006).
2 See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., 147 F. App'x 158, 177 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also
Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REv. 253, 264 (2009).
3 eBay, 547 U.S. at 393-94.
4 Id. at 394.
5 See, e.g., Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Telcordia
Tech., Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 04-876-GMS, 2014 WL 1457797, at *4 (D. Del. Apr. 14, 2014);
Clear With Computs., LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., No. 6:09-CV-479, 2012 WL 8144915, at
*8 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2012).
6 E.g., Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. BMW N. Am., LLC, 783 F. Supp. 2d 891, 899 (E.D.
Tex. 2011); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 620, 626 (E.D. Tex. 2009); I/P
Engine, Inc. v. AOL Inc., No. 2:1 lcv512, 2014 WL 309245, at *4 (E.D. Va. Jan. 28, 2014).
7 E.g., Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 670 F.3d 1171, 1193
(Fed. Cir. 2012), vacated in part, 682 F.3d 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2012) and 476 F. App'x 747 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (en banc); Morpho Detection, Inc. v. Smiths Detection Inc., No. 2:11cv498, 2013 WL
5701522, at *8 (E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2013); Tomita Techs. USA, LLC v. Nintendo Co., No. 11 Civ.
4256(JSR), 2013 WL 6504394, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2013); Paice, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 630.
8 See, e.g., Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., No. 09-290, 2014 WL
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I am not the first to draw analogies between injunctive relief in patent
law and other property doctrines. Commentators have drawn parallels between
ongoing royalties and accession,9 between ongoing royalties and nuisance, ° and
between ongoing royalties and the necessity doctrine." Indeed, Richard Epstein
has suggested that "huge returns lie from systematizing intellectual property by
analogy and extension to successful legal regimes elsewhere., 12 But in this Arti-
cle I attempt to draw out the core remedial principles at work in both the intel-
lectual property and traditional property contexts, reflecting reasoned considera-
tion, practical experience, and important value judgments. 13 I then use these
fundamental remedial principles to assess courts' awards of ongoing royalties,
particularly the practice of awarding ongoing royalties in excess of the jury-de-
termined royalty rate, arguing that enhancements of ongoing royalties frequently
run counter to traditional remedial values.
Part I of this Article discusses reasons that courts may deny injunctive
relief in cases of the invasion of property rights. Specifically, Part I looks to the
eBay factors and their historical underpinnings. Building on Part I, Part II exam-
ines the reasons that, since eBay, courts have been inclined to award ongoing
royalties as a patent remedy. Part II surveys the relative advantages and disad-
vantages of four potential remedial courses: (1) an ongoing royalty; (2) prohibi-
tory injunctions; (3) lump-sum awards; and (4) leaving the patentee to vindicate
its rights in future litigation.
Finally, Part III evaluates courts' methods of assessing ongoing royal-
ties. Part III argues that courts have too liberally awarded supracompensatory
ongoing royalties. Part III specifically takes issue with two common practices:
elevating ongoing royalties on the basis of changed circumstances governing the
parties' hypothetical negotiations, and enhancing ongoing royalties as a matter
of course under the theory that the defendant's future use of the patented inven-
tion amounts to willful infringement. Part III closes by examining potential rea-
sons to award supracompensatory ongoing royalties under the willfulness rubric.
9 See Peter Lee, The Accession Insight and Patent Infringement Remedies, 110 MICH. L. REv.
175, 205 (2011).
10 See Christopher M. Newman, Patent Infringement as Nuisance, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 61, 63
(2009).
11 See Karen E. Sandrik, Reframing Patent Remedies, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 95, 131-32 (2012).
12 Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal Re-
sponse to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REv. 455, 458 (2010).
13 See, e.g., Crocker v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 70 N.Y.S. 492, 497 (N.Y. App. Div. 1901)
("The principle which grants or withholds equitable relief is precisely the same in each case.... If
the right to its enforcement may be denied in one case, it may also be denied in the other, for the
equitable principle operates alike upon both."). I do not mean to suggest that the authors of these
referenced articles maintain that patent law perfectly mirrors their chosen analogy, but only that I
hope to extract broad, overarching equitable considerations that underlie all of these fields, includ-
ing the analogized property law.
2016]
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II. REASONS TO DENY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
A. Historical Overview
Injunctions were long held to be virtually automatic as a remedy for the
invasion of property rights. 14 Previously, this was true for property rights in gen-
eral, whether intellectual or tangible. For example, under traditional rules, mis-
taken improver cases almost always resulted in an injunction for the property
owner-the court would require the removal of the offending structure without
regard to considerations of waste, burden on the defendant, or value to the plain-
tiff.15 Where the improver mistakenly built on another's property, "the trespass
victim had the right to force the encroaching builder to remove the structure, no
matter how valuable it was, no matter how much it cost to build, no matter how
minimal the intrusion on the neighbor's land, and no matter how excusable or
understandable the mistake was." 16 More recently, however, courts have turned
to the doctrine of relative hardship to deny injunctive relief17 and, in some cases,
have required the landowner to sell the improved property for the pre-improve-
ment market value.
18
The law related to breaches of land covenants has similarly evolved from
a doctrine of automatic injunction to the more flexible doctrine that a "covenant
will not be enforced if to do so would harm one landowner without substantially
benefiting another landowner."19 And, in the famous nuisance case of Boomer v.
Atlantic Cement Co.,20 the New York Court of Appeals rejected the earlier rule
14 See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules,
106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2101 (1997).
15 Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1369,
1396 (2013).
16 Id.
17 The balancing of the equities outside of the restitution context is largely a development of
the 19th century. See George P. Smith, II, Nuisance Law: The Morphogenesis of an Historical
Revisionist Theory of Contemporary Economic Jurisprudence, 74 NEB. L. REv. 658, 690 (1995)
("In 1868, Pennsylvania became the first jurisdiction to allow a balancing of hardships between
parties in a nuisance action.").
18 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 10 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
2011) ("Modem decisions allow restitution for mistaken improvements more liberally than in the
past because the tendency of the modem law is to judge the equities between the parties on a case-
by-case basis."); Singer, supra note 15, at 1397 ("Because courts view the old rule as both unfair
and inefficient, they have relaxed the clear immunity rights of the land owner in cases of mutual
mistake... in a way that subjects property rights to a reasonableness standard that requires judg-
ment.., rather than rigid application of formal boundary designations.").
19 Grove Hill Homeowners' Ass'n v. Rice, 90 So. 3d 731, 735 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) (quoting
trial court's recognition of transition toward modem approach, and holding that the relative hard-
ship test applies as third prong of test for permanent injunction, unless breach occurs with actual
or constructive notice).
20 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
[Vol. 119
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that had been "consistently reaffirmed in several leading cases ... that where a
nuisance has been found and where there has been any substantial damage shown
by the party complaining an injunction will be granted[,]" even where there was
a "marked disparity.., in economic consequence between the effect of the in-
junction and the effect of the nuisance. 21
Patent law seems to have followed the same trajectory as other property
law regarding injunctive relief, though perhaps lagging a bit behind. Before
eBay, the Federal Circuit had imposed what amounted to an almost per se injunc-
tion rule, and eBay itself reached the Supreme Court after the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court's decision denying injunctive relief.22 But, after eBay,
courts have employed the four-factor test, which includes the balance of harms
resulting from injunctive relief or lack thereof,23 much as courts in real property
cases have invoked the relative hardship doctrine.
Despite the former presumption of an injunction in patent infringement
cases, a few pre-eBay decisions denied injunctive relief in favor of ongoing-roy-
alty-type remedies. In Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co.,24 the
district court entered a "compulsory license" on the patented invention after
denying injunctive relief 25 The Federal Circuit later cited Shatterproof Glass as
precedent for an award of ongoing royalties.2 6 Similarly, in Foster v. American
Machine & Foundry Co.,27 the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's in-
junction denial and order of a compulsory license where the injunction would
have been only "a club to be wielded by a patentee to enhance his negotiating
stance.,
28
Other older cases occasionally awarded remedies analogous to ongoing
royalties. For example, in Nerney v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad
Co.,29 the court reversed a permanent injunction that would have had little benefit
to the patentee, other than "to strengthen its position in negotiating a settlement,"
21 Id. at 872.
22 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391, 393-94 (2006).
23 See, e.g., Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 951, 966, 984-85
(N.D. Cal. 2009).
24 758 F.2d 613 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
25 Id. at 616.
26 Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In Petrella v.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., the Supreme Court noted the possibility of ongoing royalties in the
copyright context with apparent approval, although it did not explicitly condone the use of ongoing
royalties. 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1979 (2014).
27 492 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1974).
28 Id. at 1324.
29 83 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1936).
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but would have caused "a much greater injury" to an accidental infringer.30 In-
stead, the court ordered an accounting.3" In Hoe v. Boston Daily Advertiser
Corp.,32 the court denied a preliminary injunction after balancing the parties' re-
spective hardships, and the court, noting that this was "much like a final hearing"
because the facts had all been established, announced its intention to deny a per-
manent injunction, conditioned on the defendant's payment of a royalty.33 For
the most part, however, injunctions followed almost automatically after a finding
of patent infringement, until the Supreme Court's decision in eBay.
B. The eBay Factors
In eBay, the Supreme Court announced an injunction test gleaned from
"well-established principles of equity," requiring an injunction-seeking plaintiff
to prove that (1) it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) the remedies available
at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
(3) when considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defend-
ant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) the public interest would not bedisserved by a permanent injunction.3 ' Although the rigidity of a four-pronged
test may not fully capture the nuance involved in the equitable considerations
that historically have been taken into account, this test generally corresponds to
traditional reasons for denying injunctive relief"3
Justice Clarence Thomas's opinion for the Court emphasized that the
considerations identified in the four-factor test apply both inside and outside of
the patent context; nothing in the Patent Act makes patents unique.36 Thus, seeing
the equitable principles applied in other contexts allows us to thoughtfully apply
them to patent cases. This is not because patents, which are neither scarce nor
rivalrous, are identical to traditional property, but because key remedial concerns
of our legal system-such as restoring and maintaining the plaintiffs rightful
position 37-are often the same. In this section, I use the structure of the four-part
eBay test to examine reasons that courts have denied injunctive relief outside of
the patent context.
30 Id. at 411.
31 Id.
32 14 F. 914 (C.C.D. Mass. 1883).
33 Id. at 915-16.
34 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
35 Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court's Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent
Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 203, 207-08 (2012).
36 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391-92.
37 See generally Marco Jimenez, RemedialConsilience, 62 EMORY L.J. 1309, 1312-13 (2013).
[Vol. 119
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1. Irreparable Harm and Inadequacy of Legal Remedies
As many courts38 and commentators 39 have recognized, the first and sec-
ond factors of the eBay test-irreparable injury and the inadequacy of the plain-
tiff's legal remedies to cure the injury-reflect the same consideration: namely,
whether money damages (or, in theory, some other legal remedy) will adequately
compensate the patentee for any harm to its property interests. The adequacy of
a particular legal remedy may vary by context, at least to the extent that, as An-
thony Kronman argued in his influential article, this consideration reflects a con-
cern about whether courts can fix damages "without imposing an unacceptably
high risk of undercompensation on the injured promisee. 4°
Judge Richard Posner elaborated on this concept when he equated "dis-
proportion between harm to the patentee from infringement and harm to the in-
fringer and to the public from an injunction" with Justice Anthony Kennedy's
point in eBay that "legal damages may well be sufficient" in cases of patented
components of larger products. 41 Relatedly, Professor Douglas Laycock con-
tends that the irreparable injury rule is anachronistic, and that courts invoke it
only when they have some other reason to deny an injunction, such as when the
plaintiff s losses can be replaced in the market.42 Thus, the first two factors often
shade into the third factor,43 which examines the relative harms to each party
from the absence or presence of an injunction.
38 ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1337 (Fed. Cir.
2012); Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Bianco v. Globus
Med., Inc., No. 2:12-CV-00147-WCB, 2014 WL 1049067, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2014); Mer-
cExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 569 n.1 1 (E.D. Va. 2007) ("The irreparable
harm inquiry and remedy at law inquiry are essentially two sides of the same coin ... ").
39 See, e.g., 42 AM. JIJR. 2D Injunctions § 41 (2016); DouG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE ROBERTS,
REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 266 (8th ed. 2011); DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE
IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 8 (1991); Gergen et al., supra note 35, at 207-08 ("[T]he test redun-
dantly states requirements of irreparable injury and inadequacy of legal remedies.").
40 Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 351, 362 (1978); see also
i4i Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("Difficulty in estimating monetary
damages is evidence that remedies at law are inadequate."); Van Wagner Advert. Corp. v. S & M
Enters., 492 N.E.2d 756, 759-60 (N.Y. 1986) (citing Kronman, supra).
41 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 918 (N.D. Ill. 2012), rev'd in part, 757
F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
42 LAYCOCK, supra note 39, at 37.
43 This injunction "checklist" was created from equitable principles-factors that informed the
discretion of the chancellor, rather than a list of requirements. Gergen et al., supra note 35, at 211-
2016]
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2. Hardship Balancing Considerations
The third eBay factor is that, "considering the balance of hardships be-
tween the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted.",44 The Su-
preme Court's formulation does not discuss any applicable presumptions on this
factor.45 In the traditional property context, for example, some courts have placed
a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of an injunction, so that an injunction would
be denied only if the balance of equities tips strongly in favor of the defendant.
46
More recently, many courts have lifted the thumb from the scale, balancing the
equities afresh, but giving the benefit of any doubt about potential hardships to
the property owner seeking an injunction.47
After eBay, "lower courts appear to have adopted a binary approach,
granting injunctions as a matter of course to patent holders found to be active in
the marketplace and denying injunctions to entities found not to have practiced
their inventions. 4 This makes sense, given the strong relationship between the
adequacy of the legal remedies and the balance of hardships. Thus, in 1877, one
treatise author wrote that, if compensation would provide the patentee with a
sufficient remedy, "[a] rash or indiscreet exercise of [the injunction] power may
be very oppressive, of no use to the complainant and ruinous to the defendant.,
49
44 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
45 See Gergen et al., supra note 35, at 227 ("Notably, when balance-of-hardships concerns
enter through the undue-hardship defense, the right violator bears a considerable burden of pro-
duction from the start, a situation that contrasts with that under an eBay test unsupplemented by
any presumptions in favor of the right holder.").
46 See, e.g., Tauscher v. Andruss, 401 P.2d 40, 42 (Or. 1965) ("Since the defendants are in
effect asking the court to recognize a kind of eminent domain for private purposes, the dispropor-
tion between their damage resulting from the removal of the encroachment and the plaintiffs' dam-
age if the injunction is denied must be great."); Tashakori v. Lakis, 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 838, 843
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011) ("[T]he hardship to the defendant from granting the injunction 'must be
greatly disproportionate to the hardship caused plaintiff by the continuance of the encroachment
and this fact must clearly appear in the evidence and must be proved by the defendant."'); Cogdell
v. 1999 O'Ravez Family, LLC, 220 P.3d 1259, 1262 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (requiring "an enor-
mous disparity in the resulting hardships").
47 See Gergen et al., supra note 35, at 227.
48 Matthew Tokson, Judicial Resistance and Legal Change, 82 U. CI. L. REV. 901, 943
(2015).
49 ORLANDO F. BUMP, THE LAW OF PATENTS, TRADE-MARKS, AND COPY-RIGHTS 301 (1877)
(quoting Sanders v. Logan, 21 F. Cas. 321 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1861)). Bump continued to quote Sand-
ers:
As a remedy it should be administered only for prevention or protection.
Where it is not necessary for these purposes it is merely vindictive, injuring
one party without benefit to the other. To issue an injunction in a case where
neither prevention nor protection is sought or required, but only compensation,
would be an abuse of power.
[Vol. 119
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Here again, we can gain insight from the application of this remedial
"relative hardship" analysis in other property doctrines.5" Property ownership
generally includes the right to exclude others and, correspondingly, the right to
keep one's property, including through injunctive relief.51 But those rights are
not absolute-in certain situations, forced property transactions may conform to
natural rights,52 avoid inefficiencies, 53 or conform to natural law, 54 corresponding
to one's theory of property. 5
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA") allows for injunctions that
"condition future use upon payment of a reasonable royalty for no longer than
the period of time for which use could have been prohibited," at least in "excep-
tional circumstances. 56 Thus, where a defendant inadvertently acquires the
plaintiff's trade secret (such as from a third party), the defendant's "material and
prejudicial change of position prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of
misappropriation [might] render[] a prohibitive injunction inequitable., 57 In such
a case, the defendant-whose heavy investments in the use of the trade secret
would be wasted if an injunction is granted-would be significantly harmed by
an injunction. The UTSA also takes into account the harm to the plaintiff that
would result from the defendant's continued use of the trade secret.58 But, if the
plaintiff will not be significantly harmed by the defendant's continued use, equity
will permit the defendant to continue to use the trade secret in exchange for pay-
ment of a royalty.
We see the same consideration in the continuing nuisance context, which
Justice Tom C. Clark described as "forc[ing] the courts into difficult situations
where modem hybrids of the traditional concepts of nuisance law and equity
must be fashioned., 59 In such a case, the court "must decide whether injunctive
relief, damages, or some combination of the two best satisfies the particular de-
mands of the case before it."' 60 There are several reasons that a court may choose
50 Singer, supra note 15, at 1395-96; DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 341
(4th ed. 2012) ("It should not matter whether that investment was in a building or a business or a
technology. If defendant was not reckless with regard to plaintiff's patent rights, the undue hard-
ship defense readily applies.").
51 Singer, supra note 15, at 1391.
52 Deepa Varadarajan, Improvement Doctrines, 21 GEO. MASON L. REv. 657, 676-78 (2014).
53 Id.
54 See generally ADAM J. MACLEOD, PROPERTY AND PRACTICAL REASON 1-4 (2015).
55 See Singer, supra note 15, at 1396.
56 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2 (UNIF. LAw COMM'N 1985).
57 Id.
58 Id. § 2 cmt. (counseling to "weigh[] an aggrieved person's interests").
59 Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders Co., 528 F.2d 1107, 1120 (7th Cir. 1975) (Clark, J.,
sitting by designation).
60 Id. at 1122.
2016]
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to enforce a property right with a liability rule rather than a property rule,6' but
these courts usually first determine that the defendant's use will not interfere with
the plaintiff s plans for her property.62
i. Opportunism
Courts balancing the parties' hardships consider "the object for which
an injunction is being sought., 63 A plaintiff seeking an injunction is sometimes
not really interested in excluding the defendant from the property, but is instead
seeking an injunction to create negotiating leverage,64 or merely for "harassment
of [a] bitter rival., 65 This is most likely to be true where an injunction would
require a costly redesign or factory retooling,66 where the patent is part of an
industry standard,67 or where the patented invention is a small component of a
much larger device, and the device would have to be pulled from the market
during redesign efforts. 68 "If injunctions have in practice been more targeted to-
ward party opportunism than damages, this makes sense: The reasons for both
61 See Epstein, supra note 14, at 2107 (discussing Roman law's willingness to use a liability
rule in "the situation created by the mistaken joinder of the property or labor of two or more indi-
viduals").
62 See, e.g., Goldbacher v. Eggers, 76 N.Y.S. 881, 885 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1902) ("The plaintiff
makes no special or peculiar use of her lot which requires the use of the strip encroached upon.
The lot is for sale, and, although diminished in value, it is just as available for purposes of building
or sale as heretofore.").
63 Am. JUR. 2D Injunctions, supra note 39, § 38.
64 Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Comput., Inc., No. 06-cv-462-bbc, 2010 WL 1607908, at *1 (W.D.
Wis. Apr. 19, 2010) (denying injunction sought "to increase.., leverage in negotiations for a
higher licensing fee").
65 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d
1363, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("Injunctive relief ought not to act as a form of 'extra damages' to
compensate for litigation costs.").
66 See Apple, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 920-21, rev'd in part, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
67 See Daryl Lim, Standard Essential Patents, Trolls, and the Smartphone Wars: Triangulat-
ing the End Game, 119 PENN ST. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (2014).
68 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 396-97 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
In this respect, we can gain significant insight from the application of the accession doctrine to
personal property. See, e.g., Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311,319 (1871) (discussing the doctrine
as it would pertain to a stolen beam of lumber used in a house). Peter Lee has offered a thorough
discussion of the accession doctrine as it might be applied to patent injunctions. See Lee, supra
note 9. He is not the first to apply accession to intellectual property doctrines-Jay Koh did so with
respect to the inevitable misappropriation doctrine of trade secrets. See Jay L. Koh, From Hoops
to Hard Drives: An Accession Law Approach to the Inevitable Misappropriation of Trade Secrets,
48 AM. U. L. REv. 271 (1998).
[Vol. 119
10
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 119, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 12
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol119/iss1/12
ENHANCED ONGOING ROYALTIES
giving and withholding injunctions make direct reference to the possibility of
individual opportunism.
69
Encroachment cases provide an excellent example of injunctions that
may be sought for bargaining leverage. For example, if a trespass consists of a
small encroachment by a structure located primarily on the defendant's property,
the plaintiff is likely to be significantly enriched by leveraging a mandatory in-
junction that would order the encroachment removed at great expense to the de-
fendant.
To avoid what is perceived as a wasteful or unjust leveraging opportunity
by the property owner, an "[i]njunction against a trespass is sometimes refused
because the hardship, injury, or inconvenience that it would cause the defendant
is out of all proportion to the benefit it would bring to the plaintiff."7 ° Or, as Dan
Dobbs put it:
if an injunction issues to compel defendant to remove the build-
ing, the plaintiff may be tempted to engage in extortion by of-
fering to sell the land to the defendant at an exhorbitant [sic]
price. If the cost of removing the encroaching structure is very
high, defendant may well be forced to buy plaintiffs land, or
part of it, at a price many times its worth, rather than destroy the
building that encroaches an inch or two. Thus, to grant an in-
junction compelling removal of the building may be a prelude
to extortion by the plaintiff.71
Once the injunction is denied and the property owner is relegated to an
action at law for damages, the practical effect is a forced sale.72 The property
owner recovers the value of the encroached property, and the property owner's
remedy for the continuing trespass will be exhausted.
Injunctions (or the threat of injunctions) create negotiating leverage by
allowing the property owner to capitalize on the defendant's switching costs-
costs tied not to the value of the property but to the costs of migrating to a non-
trespassing alternative (such as changing the manufacturing process, redesigning
an article, or even exiting the business altogether).73 Because of switching costs,
69 Gergen et al., supra note 35, at 239.
70 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions, supra note 39, § 110.
71 Dan B. Dobbs, Trespass to Land in North Carolina Part II-Remedies for Trespass, 47 N.C.
L. REv. 334, 366 (1969).
72 Crocker v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 70 N.Y.S. 492, 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 1901) ("It is quite
possible to embody in a judgment a protection of defendant's right to maintain its wall on the
payment of damages, without requiring a grant of the easement, but the result is not different if the
easement be conveyed.").
73 Robert W. Hahn & Hal J. Singer, Assessing Bias in Patent Infringement Cases: A Review of
International Trade Commission Decisions, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 457, 486 (2008).
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an injunction can arm patentees with leverage to obtain supracompetitive licens-
ing fees. With that in mind, patentees may request injunctions to obtain licensing
leverage even where they are not interested in preventing infringement--even
where, in the absence of an injunction, the patentee would actually prefer the
defendant to continue infringing, so that it could continue to monetize its patent
via damages. Thus, in cases of high switching costs, courts will be especially
wary of the plaintiff's motive in seeking an injunction.74
ii. Laches
The concern about patentee opportunism stems from prospective switch-
ing costs-the defendant's sunk investment in the infringing product or process
is relevant only as a proxy for switching costs. 75 But this does not mean that an
infringer's past investments are unimportant in the injunction analysis. Past in-
vestments have always been relevant to determinations of equitable relief such
as injunctions, because they may demonstrate that the plaintiffs delay in filing
suit prejudiced the defendant.76 Laches results from the plaintiffs inexcusable
delay in taking action, if the delay results in prejudice to the defendant.77 A find-
ing of laches militates against injunctive relief.78 Thus, if the plaintiff should have
sued earlier but failed to do so, and if the defendant suffered economic prejudice
as a result of investments during the delay period that an injunction would nul-
lify, injunctive relief may be unavailable to the plaintiff.79
Laches may correlate to the level of injury that the plaintiff suffers by
virtue of the defendant's infringement. If the patentee is truly irreparably injured
by the defendant's infringement, and if the patentee's plans are better served by
74 See, e.g., VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 816, 826-27 (E.D. Tex. 2013), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, vacated in part sub nom., Virnet X, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308,
1324 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (denying injunction where cost of compliance would exceed $50 million).
75 Note that some have discussed the infringer's past investments as creating injunction lever-
age. See, e.g., Barnard v. Gibson, 48 U.S. 650, 657 (1849); Nicholas P. Chan, Comment, Balancing
Judicial Misvaluation and Patent Hold-Up: Some Principles for Considering Injunctive Relief Af-
ter Ebay, 59 UCLA L. REV. 746, 746 (2012). But this is true only insofar as the past investments
are a proxy for prospective switching costs. If, for example, an infringer invested $5 million in an
infringing process but, because of technological advances, could later switch to a non-infringing
process for no additional costs, those past investments would not create injunctive leverage, even
if it meant that the $5 million sunk cost would be rendered worthless.
76 Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1978-79 (2014).
77 Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 949 (10th Cir. 2002) (copyright infringement);
A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
78 Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1978-79.
79 This is similar to the considerations governing equitable estoppel by silence. See generally
Ex'rs of Wendell v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns. Ch. 344, 354 (N.Y. Ch. 1815). Similarly, the doctrine
of unjust enrichment may be thought to apply, given that the patentee may be unjustly enriched by
the increased value of his patent resulting from the defendant's successful commercialization and
marketing of the patented invention.
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removing infringers from the market than by collecting money from them, one
would expect the patentee to be vigilant about monitoring for infringement and
filing suit against infringers.8"
iii. Interference with the Property Owner's Plans
Underlying all of the factors discussed so far-the adequacy of the plain-
tiffs legal remedy, the likelihood that the patentee seeks the injunction for op-
portunistic purposes, and the plaintiffs diligence in pursuing legal action-is a
consideration of the property owner's plans for the property, and the degree to
which those plans would be impeded by the defendant's actions. Thus, a plaintiff
who is using the patented invention to compete in the marketplace will almost
certainly be held to suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction,81 and will also
be less likely to be seeking the injunction merely as negotiating leverage. Con-
sequently, a property owner with plans for the property is much less likely to be
subject to a forced transaction.82
On the other hand, a forced transaction "might well be acceptable in the
case of property held purely for investment, the owner's expectations being lim-
ited to a subsequent resale., 83 California's betterment statute specifies that, "[i]n
determining the appropriate form of relief under this section, the court shall take
80 See SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 807 F.3d 1311,
1331 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) ("Unreasonable delay in bringing suit may also be relevant to a
patentee's claim that continued infringement will cause it irreparable injury.").
81 See, e.g., Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 702 F.3d 1351, 1363-
64 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (reversing lower court's denial of injunctive relief as abuse of discretion where
patentee and infringer were direct competitors); Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 730 F. Supp.
2d 333, 337-38 (D. Del. 2010) ("Courts awarding permanent injunctions typically do so under
circumstances where plaintiff practices its invention and is a direct market competitor." (quoting
Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 585 F. Supp. 2d 600, 619 n.21 (D. Del. 2008), rev'd on other
grounds, 576 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009))); Laserdynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comput., Inc., No. 2:06-
cv-348-TJW, 2010 WL 2574059, at *2 (E.D. Tex. June 22, 2010) ("The best case for obtaining a
permanent injunction often occurs when the plaintiff and defendant are competing in the same
market. In that context, the harm in allowing the defendant to continue infringing is the greatest.").
82 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 10 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
2011) (stating that a forced transaction "would probably be unacceptably harsh in the case of prop-
erty occupied by the owner, or property as to which the owner had formed definite expectations of
future use"); see also Cogdell v. 1999 O'Ravez Family, LLC, 220 P.3d 1259 (Wash. Ct. App.
2009) (requiring that there be "ample remaining room for a structure suitable for the area and there
is no real limitation on the property's future use").
83 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 10 cmt. a (AM. LAw. INST.
2011); see also Clear With Computs., LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., No. 6:09-CV-479, 2012
WL 8144915, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2012) ("[D]ue to CWC's business model as a licensing
entity, monetary damages are particularly appropriate.").
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into consideration any plans the owner of the land may have for the use or devel-
opment of the land upon which the improvement was made. 84
It is no surprise, then, that courts regularly emphasize the importance of
avoiding interference with the property owner's plans for the property. 85 Thus,
where the owner has plans for the property in a mistaken improver case, and
those plans make the new building an encumbrance to the owner rather than a
benefit, the owner will not be forced to pay for the building or sell the lot.86 In-
deed, the owner may be entitled to recover demolition costs from the improver,
at least if no other property will serve the owner's purposes.87 As the Restatement
(Third) of Restitution puts it, "A remedy for mistaken improvement that subjects
the owner to a forced exchange will be qualified or limited to avoid undue prej-
udice to the owner., 88
Courts have applied a similar reasoning to ongoing royalties in patent
infringement-their decisions have been based on, among other things, whether
the defendant's infringement impairs the patentee's plans to commercialize the
patent. 89 Where the patentee uses its right to exclude to create a competitive ad-
vantage in the industry, the patentee is likely to suffer harm that is difficult to
quantify, making the hardships much more difficult to balance. 90
iv. Intentional Misconduct
A wrongdoer's intentional misconduct impacts courts' willingness to
balance the hardships of an injunction. An intentional wrongdoer is unlikely to
84 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 871.5 (West 2016).
85 In speaking of unjust enrichment, Professor Ernest J. Weinrib notes that the law treats a
defendant as having accepted a beneficial transfer in certain cases "because, given the nature of
the defendant's activities and projects, the defendant has no reason not to accept it." ERNEST J.
WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 211 (2012).
86 See id. at 198 ("At bottom, subjective devaluation is not about the nature of the enrichment,
but about the transferee's freedom to make his or her own choices. This ... important considera-
tion ... concerns not the existence of an enrichment but the justness of the defendant's retaining
it.").
87 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 10 cmt. g, illus. 17 (AM.
LAW INST. 2011); see also Douglas Laycock, Restoring Restitution to the Canon, 110 MICH. L.
REv. 929, 933 (2012). This corresponds nicely with Professor Adam MacLeod's argument in a
recently published book discussing a natural-law theory of property resting in part on owners'
capacities as practically-reasonable beings to make plans with respect to their property. See
MACLEOD, supra note 54.
88 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 10 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
89 Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., No. 08-cv-335-IEG-NLS, 2013
WL 4068833, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2013) ("Presidio and ATC are direct competitors. There-
fore, the Court finds that Presidio has shown irreparable harm." (citation omitted)).
90 ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. VerizonCommc'ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1337-39 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (district court erred in finding irreparable harm where the patentee and the defendant did not
compete, and where the "losses to [the patentee] are clearly quantifiable").
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gamer much sympathy for its concerns about the harms that would result from
an injunction. This has long been true both in the traditional property context, as
well as in the patent context.
a. Outside of the Patent Context
If the defendant intentionally appropriated the plaintiffs property, the
defendant will be precluded from claiming the protection of the balance of
harms. 91 Thus, where the defendant intentionally builds an encroaching structure
on someone else's property, a mandatory injunction is all but certain. The re-
quirement that the property invasion be unintentional avoids conferring on pri-
vate parties a right of private eminent domain. 92
In some cases, however, a trespasser's encroachment begins innocently,
but the trespasser becomes aware of the other party's property rights during the
construction and nevertheless proceeds to build on the plaintiffs property.93 In
these cases, courts must decide how to characterize the defendant's culpability.
For example, in Tyler v. City of Haverhill,94 the court affirmed an injunction
where the defendant "entered upon the land of the plaintiff... in good faith" but
"notice was given by the plaintiff, within a few days after excevations [sic] for
the wall were begun." 95 But the court recognized that, if the innocent investment
were significant enough prior to notice of the other party's rights, the injunction
might properly be denied even if the defendant continued the encroachment after
notice:
Undoubtedly there may be circumstances which a court of eq-
uity will regard as full justification for refusing to require re-
moval of a nuisance created under claim of right and endured
when it might have been stopped; especially when great and dis-
proportionate loss results to its creator, and the value of the land
is not affected.96
Similarly, in a case under California's mistaken-improver laws, the
plaintiff had warned the defendant that an improvement was on plaintiffs land
while the defendant was still constructing the improvement. The California ap-
91 Whitlock v. Hilander Foods, Inc., 720 N.E.2d 302, 307 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); RENDLEMAN &
ROBERTS, supra note 39, at 117. But see Morrison v. Jones, 430 S.W.2d 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968).
92 See, e.g., Ottavia v. Savarese, 155 N.E.2d 432, 436 (Mass. 1959).
93 Raab v. Casper, 124 Cal. Rptr. 590, 594-95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (trespass may be "charac-
terized by good faith at its inception ... but suffering a shift in that characteristic when a warning
of possible trespass or encroachment is received before completion").
94 172 N.E. 342 (Mass. 1930).
95 Id. at 342.
96 Id. at 343.
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pellate court noted that, "[i]n weighing the grant, denial or apportionment of re-
lief, a trial court should consider any interim warning, the character and relative
cost of the improvements made before and after the warning and the unitary or
separable character of the improvements."
97
In Whitlock v. Hilander Foods,98 the Illinois appellate court reversed the
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, holding that a
trial would be required on remand to determine whether the defendant willfully
disregarded the plaintiffs rights (which would foreclose a hardship-balancing
analysis). In that case, the plaintiff had protested the defendant's trespass at some
point during the construction. 99 But it was unclear exactly when during the con-
struction process the plaintiff "told defendant that he would not simply accept
the encroachment."' 00
Sometimes, the improver will know of the other party's claim of owner-
ship and nevertheless proceed to build on the property based on the improver's
good faith belief that he is the lawful owner. In such a case, the court may decline
to balance hardships, even though the improver is not an intentional wrongdoer.
Goulding v. Cook'01 offers one such example.
In Goulding, the Cooks and Gouldings disputed ownership of a parcel of
land where the Cooks sought to locate a septic tank, although they had not yet
placed the tank on the property when the dispute began. 0 2 After the Gouldings
sued and the requested preliminary injunction was denied, the Cooks placed the
septic system on the disputed property)0 3 The trial court held that the Gouldings
owned the property, but it granted an easement to the Cooks for the septic sys-
tem. 
104
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the
trial court misbalanced the hardships and, more importantly, although the Cooks
had a good faith claim to the disputed land supported by objective facts, "they
were told that they proceeded at their peril, and the matter was in litigation and
awaiting disposition when they went ahead and acted.' 0 5 We also find a rough
parallel in the unjust enrichment context, in which the Restatement (Third) would
97 Raab, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 595. The court continued: "it is not practical to fasten separate find-
ings of good and bad faith upon separate physical parts of an indivisible physical project. The court
may conclude that the improver's intransigence equates with negligence rather than dishonesty."
Id.
98 720 N.E.2d 302, 308-09 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
99 Id. at 307-08.
100 Id.
101 661 N.E.2d 1322, 1324 (Mass. 1996).
102 Id. at 1323.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 1325.
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foreclose restitution of money "voluntarily paid in the face of a recognized un-
certainty as to the existence or extent of the payor's obligation to the recipi-
ent .. ,,106
As the Goulding court noted, "notice of an opposing claim is not decisive
on the question of good faith. . ,107 but it matters. The court's discretion will
be guided by determinations about the reasonableness of the defendant's post-
notice conduct.10 8 Thus, in a case in which the defendant's wall footings en-
croached between one and three inches underneath the plaintiff s property, and
the defendant had ordered a second survey conducted after the plaintiff com-
plained that the defendant was digging on her land, and where the defendant
made reasonable (even if ultimately unsuccessful) efforts to ensure that its wall
was entirely on its own land, the court held that an injunction was not war-
ranted. 109
For unjust enrichment, the Restatement (Third) defines "notice" of a fact
as either knowing the fact or having reason to know it.110 Reason to know a fact
exists if (1) the person "has received an effective notification," (2) knowledge is
imputed by statute (such as provisions for notice by filing or recording), or (3)
other facts would make it reasonable to infer the existence of the fact or would
cause a prudent person to conduct further inquiry that would reveal it.11' This
definition of notice can be usefully applied in the patent context as well.
b. Application in the Patent Context
The law's requirement that the injunction-avoiding defendant not be an
intentional wrongdoer "focuses attention on a recurring question" in these cases:
"Would it have been feasible to make a contract to cover this transaction before
either side took action?"' 12 A contract is preferable where feasible because the
property owner can then rely on his own subjective value of his property, con-
sidering his plans for the property, instead of the need to collectively assess an
106 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 6 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST.
2011).
107 Goulding, 661 N.E.2d at 1324 n.4.
108 Cogdell v. 1999 O'Ravez Family, LLC, 220 P.3d 1259, 1262 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) ("[T]he
encroacher must prove.., by clear and convincing evidence... [that, among other things, the
encroacher] did not simply take a calculated risk or act in bad faith, or act negligently, willfully, or
indifferently in locating the encroaching structure." (quoting Procter v. Huntington, 192 P.3d 958
(2008))); Singer, supra note 15, at 1397 ("[Courts] have... [relaxed the owner's rights] in a way
that subjects property rights to a reasonableness standard that requires judgment about the excusa-
bility of the builder's conduct rather than rigid application of formal boundary designations.").
109 Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 235 P.2d 592, 596 (Colo. 1951) (en banc).
110 • RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 69 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
III Id.
112 Laycock, supra note 87, at 933.
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objective value, and the defendant will not yet have incurred any switching
costs. 1 13 Thus, the willful wrongdoer, who could have contracted for use of the
property, will not get the benefit of hardship balancing and will be subjected to
a property rule rather than a liability rule.
But this does not mean that the court should decline to balance the equi-
ties in every patent case in which the patentee is held to "willfully" infringe under
the patent laws.114 Patent Act willfulness may permit treble damages,115 and, until
very recently, the plaintiff bore the burden to prove willfulness by clear and con-
vincing evidence.116 But what starts out as innocent infringement may become
willful infringement over time, once the defendant learns of the patent's exist-
ence.117 For equities-balancing purposes, however, the important question is
whether we should fault the defendant for failing to procure a contract prior to
investing significant unrecoupable resources in the infringement.11 8 This is not
113 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalien-
ability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1125 (1972).
114 Sandrik, supra note 11, at 99, 145 (discussing "tension" that "occurs when an infringer is
deemed a willful one that may be subject to enhanced damages, but then that same willful infringer
is allowed to continue infringing the patented technology").
115 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) does not provide a limiting standard for enhanced damages but, until
recently, judicial gloss limited enhancements to willful infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 284; see In re
Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007), abrogated by Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse
Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). In Halo, the Supreme Court implied that most enhanced dam-
ages should be the result of willful infringement, although it rejected the Federal Circuit's overly
rigid test for willfulness. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932. The Court also left open a narrow possibility
that enhanced damages may be warranted even in cases of non-willful infringement. Id. at 1933-
34.
116 WestemGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert.
granted, judgment vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016). In Halo, the Supreme Court rejected the "clear
and convincing" standard for willfulness. See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1934.
117 Sandrik, supra note 11, at 107 (discussing the dynamicity of willfulness). The Federal Cir-
cuit has sometimes indicated that willfulness is determined as of the time infringement began, but
at other times it has indicated that willfulness is determined when the infringer receives notice of
the patent, and individual judges have sometimes suggested that willfulness changes over the
course of infringement because patent infringement is a continuing tort. 4 ROBERT A. MATTHEWS,
JR., ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 31:24 (collecting cases for each).
118 Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 951, 984-85 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
("To be sure, one who elects to build a business on a product found to infringe cannot be heard to
complain if an injunction against continuing infringement destroys the business so elected. But by
the time Hynix became aware of Rambus's asserted patents, Rambus's technologies were en-
trenched in the industry standard DRAM interface." (quoting Windsurfing Intern. Inc. v. AMF,
Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1003 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (internal quotation omitted)). This is similar to
Justice Stephen Breyer's emphasis in his concurrence in Halo, in which he stressed that the thresh-
old is egregiousness, and not every case of what might be termed "willful" infringement amounts
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unlike the trade secret context, in which the Uniform Trade Secrets Act is con-
cerned not with whether the defendant intentionally misappropriated the trade
secret at any point prior to judgment, but instead with whether the defendant
acted intentionally at the time the defendant poured resources into the trade se-
cret.119
For the purposes of balancing the interests of the parties in assessing
appropriate injunctive relief, the question should be the reasonableness of the
infringer's conduct once it had "notice" of the patentee's rights.12° Switching
costs will be a factor in the reasonableness of that conduct. 121 Applying this
standard, if the patentee can show that the defendant had notice of the patent's
existence before switching costs became significant, this would generally fore-
close a balancing of the harms in a request for an injunction, unless the infringer
can show a strong reason to believe that the patent was not infringed or was in-
valid.1 21
In one pre-eBay case, the court rejected the defendant's request for a
compulsory license, noting that "Congress did not see fit to include [compulsory
licenses] in the Patent Laws., 123 But, importantly, the court also noted that the
argument must be rejected because "[t]he Court has found the infringement in
this case to be willful and wanton., 124 In that case, the defendant had obtained
and reverse engineered the patentee's products before bringing its own product
to market, and had obtained a copy of the patent.125 Thus, the defendant inten-
tionally took the patentee's property before switching costs became an issue,
warranting injunctive relief
It is clear that not all "willful" patent infringements amount to the inten-
tional wrongdoing of the type to foreclose a balancing of the hardships. But, as
the Goulding case demonstrates, some non-"willful" patent infringements, at
least under the old Seagate standard for willfulness, may nevertheless preclude
119 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1985) (requiring "prejudicial change
of position prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation...").
120 The precision of the notice will matter as well. Thus, Justice Kennedy's concurrence in eBay
noted that the "potential vagueness and suspect validity" of business method patents would affect
the four-factor analysis. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
121 Remember that notice consists of actual notice, statutory notice, or inquiry notice. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 69 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
122 Peter Lee's accession proposal would similarly place the burden of proof on the infringer to
prove that the economic value of the infringer's contribution substantially exceeds the economic
value of the original patented invention. See Lee, supra note 9, at 205.
123 Shiley, Inc. v. Bentley Labs., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 964, 971 (C.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 794 F.2d
1561 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
124 Id.
125 Id. at 967-69.
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hardship balancing. 126 In Goulding, the Cooks' conduct-proceeding to install a
septic tank underneath disputed property-would not have amounted to willful
infringement under the Patent Act, because their argument of ownership was
"supported by objective facts" and, therefore, not objectively unreasonable (as
was formerly required under Seagate for willful infringement). 127
Once the burden is on the defendant to show that he had good reason to
believe his actions did not infringe a valid patent, a mere suspicion that the patent
might be invalid or not infringed-even a reasonable suspicion that would avoid
a "willfulness" determination-should be insufficient for hardship-balancing
purposes. 128 An infringer with nothing more than a plausible argument of inva-
lidity would likely be proceeding in the face of a recognized uncertainty, and
could not claim to have acted reasonably after receiving notice of the patentee's
property rights.129 In a case like this, the infringer's most reasonable course of
action likely would have been to negotiate for a license (discounting for uncer-
tainty of infringement and validity) or to minimize harm by pursuing a declara-
tory judgment before the infringement began. 130 It is the infringer's state of mind
at the time of infringement-not its ability to muster a credible argument by the
time trial rolls around-that matters for these purposes.13 ' This is similar to cases
in the real property context that have criticized defendants for acting unreasona-
bly, such as neglecting to conduct a survey after being put on notice of the plain-
tiffs claim of ownership.1 32 Thus, balancing will depend on the infringer's pre-
126 The Seagate standard, requiring objective recklessness, was struck down by the Supreme
Court in Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 (2016).
127 Goulding v. Cook, 661 N.E.2d 1322, 1325 (Mass. 1996).
128 For this proposition in the mistaken improvement context, see James v. Bailey, 370 F. Supp.
469, 472 (D.V.I. 1974) and Vulovich v. Baich, 143 N.Y.S.2d 247, 250 (N.Y. App. Div.
1955) ("[E]quity will refuse its aid where the claim [of title] is frivolus [sic], presumptuous or
merely conjectural ... ").
129 See Laycock, supra note 87, at 934-35.
130 This is especially true where the infringement has not yet begun, so that the time and ex-
pense associated with determining infringement damages will not be an issue in the litigation.
Nevertheless, patent infringement litigation, including declaratory judgment actions (which inevi-
tably result in infringement counterclaims where the defendant has already begun its planned
course of conduct), are expensive to litigate. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW Ass'N, REPORT OF
THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2015 37-38 (2015) (for suits with $1 million to $10 million in disputes,
median costs of $950,000 through discovery and $2 million to litigate). Where the infringer files
for a declaratory judgment action with a good argument of non-infringement or invalidity but,
during the litigation's pendency, invests in infringement for a good reason, such as a closing market
window, the infringer would be more likely to be able to benefit from a hardship-balancing analysis
at the injunction stage.
131 In Halo, the Supreme Court redirected the enhanced damages standard to reflect this notion.
Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933.
132 See, e.g., Raab v. Casper, 124 Cal. Rptr. 590, 594 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (criticizing the im-
prover, who had begun building a cabin, for "disregard[ing] the [owner's] warning and spen[ding]
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notice incurrence of switching costs considered together with the reasonableness
of its post-notice conduct.
3. Public Interest and Burden on the Court
The final eBay factor is whether the public interest would be disserved
by a permanent injunction. 133 Although many courts have justified injunctions
on the ground of a public interest in strong patent rights, those courts focus on
the wrong question under the Supreme Court's eBay guidance. Indeed, as the
Federal Circuit noted, "If the general public interest in upholding patent rights
alone was sufficient to mandate injunctive relief when none of the other three
factors support injunctive relief, then we would be back to the general rule that a
patentee should always receive an injunction against infringement."' 134 The ques-
tion at issue is whether there is anything particular to this patent or this defend-
ant's infringement such that, if the defendant's infringement were enjoined, the
public interest would suffer in some significant way,1 35 or, as the Court put it,
whether "the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunc-
tion." 36 Usually, that requires more than simply that prices might increase, or
an additional $2,206.85 to complete the cabin... without a survey and without offering to share
in the cost of a survey").
133 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006).
134 ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1341 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
135 Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 702 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2012) ("Of course the axiomatic remedy for trespass on property rights is removal of the tres-
passer. However, particularly with an eye to protecting the public interest, the decision to deny a
permanent injunction remains within the equitable discretion of the district courts." (citations omit-
ted)).
136 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
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that a product would be removed from the market.1 37 This factor's strongest in-
fluence has been in health care related cases, 138 as well as some technology
cases. 139
In some cases, injunctive relief is denied because the court anticipates a
heavy burden on the judiciary if an injunction is entered. Thus, in one British
case involving breach of a property lease, the court held that, even though the
legal remedy was inadequate, the parties were likely to dispute the sufficiency of
defendant's compliance with the injunction, and the injunction could not be
framed sufficiently specifically to provide advance certainty to the court and par-
ties about the level of compliance prior to any given dispute.14° Consequently,
the court held that an injunction was not warranted. 141 Similarly, in Apple, Inc.
v. Motorola, Inc., Judge Posner suggested that an injunction should be denied if
it would have a significant "cost to the judiciary" because it was sought for the
purpose of "harassment of [the patentee's] bitter rival, requiring particularly
watchful supervision by the court should it issue the injunction .... ,142 And, in
eBay, the district court discussed the probability of "contempt hearing after con-
tempt hearing" that would result "in extraordinary costs to the parties, as well as
considerable judicial resources., 143
137 Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers Prods. Co., 717 F.3d 1336, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2013);
see also Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 920-21 (N.D. Ill. 2012) ("Also ignored
are the harm that an injunction might cause to consumers who can no longer buy preferred products
because their sales have been enjoined .... "), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir.
2014), and overruled by Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
138 Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 670 F.3d 1171, 1192 (Fed. Cir.
2012) ("The district court denied Bard's request for a permanent injunction finding that it was in
the public interest to allow competition in the medical device arena .. "), vacated in part, 682
F.3d 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Conceptus, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc., No. C 09-02280 WHA, 2012 WL
44064, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2012) ("[T]he public benefit of having two products with different
qualities in the transcervical hysteroscopic sterilization market militates strongly against an injunc-
tion."); see also Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay:
An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REv. 1949, 1996-99 (2016) (describing correlation between
medical patent cases and denial of injunctive relief).
139 See, e.g., MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 586-87 (E.D. Va.
2007).
140 Coop. Ins. Soc'y, Ltd. v. Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd. [1998] AC 1 (HL).
141 Id.
142 Apple, 869 F. Supp. 2d. at 920-21.
143 MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 714 (E.D. Va. 2003) aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
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III. ONGOING ROYALTIES AS THE PREFERRED REMEDY
In general, courts concerned about future patent infringement have three
remedial options, largely corresponding to the options discussed in Guido Cala-
bresi and A. Douglas Melamed's famous "Cathedral" article. 144 They can (1) en-
ter an injunction prohibiting any future infringement, on penalty of contempt; (2)
deny the injunction, and simply leave any future infringement to a potential fu-
ture lawsuit filed by the plaintiff; 45 or (3) deny the injunction and assess ongoing
royalties, effectively ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff a set amount for
every act of infringement.
46
The concerns discussed in Part I all factor into the court's decision to
deny an injunction. 147 But the court is not required to award an ongoing royalty
every time it denies an injunction, 148 so we must examine the reasons that courts
have preferred ongoing royalties over future infringement litigation or future
damages in the form of a lump-sum award. As discussed below, ongoing royal-
ties offer at least three benefits relative to future periodic lawsuits: they increase
certainty, they decrease the burden on the parties, and they may decrease the
burden on the court. And, relative to a lump-sum award, ongoing royalties have
the benefit of more accurately compensating the patentee.
A. Ongoing Royalties Compared to Future Litigation
1. Certainty and the Burden on the Parties
We can again turn to other property areas to understand why courts pre-
fer ongoing royalties may be superior to leaving the patentee to future lawsuits.
144 See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 113.
145 See Van Wagner Advert. Corp. v. S & M Enters., 492 N.E.2d 756, 760-62 (N.Y. 1986)
(affirming denial of specific performance for real property lease, but modifying and remanding
trial court's order finding damages only through trial, holding that "[d]amages should have been
awarded through the expiration of [the] lease"); see also Paul M. Janicke, Implementing the "Ad-
equate Remedy at Law "for Ongoing Patent Infringement After eBay v. MercExchange, 51 IDEA
163,204 (2011) (arguing that courts should generally leave plaintiffs to future litigation, except in
cases in which the injunction is denied for public interest).
146 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 113, at 1115. Under the Calabresi/Melamed matrix, the
court could also theoretically enjoin future infringement if the plaintiff pays the defendant. Id. at
1116.
147 See also Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 WL
4479500, at *39 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015) (noting, in the copyright context, that "a continuing
royalty may be an appropriate alternative to the 'harsh and drastic' remedy of injunctive relief
under 'special circumstances."' (quoting Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988),
affd sub nom., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990))).
148 Whitserve, LLC v. Comput. Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 36 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (referring to
the ongoing royalty as a "compulsory license" and remanding for the district court to explain its
reasons for declining to award ongoing royalty).
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Return to the defendant who mistakenly builds on the plaintiffs property. The
plaintiff files a lawsuit, asking the court to enjoin the defendant from trespassing
on the property. If the court denies the injunction, and simply orders the defend-
ant to pay the use value from the time of the improvement through trial (that is,
rental value), the parties will be uncertain as to the status of the property going
forward. 149 Can the property owner tear the structure down or alter the structure?
Can the improver use the structure without interference from the property owner?
Neither party will be able to form plans for the property, or to conduct its affairs
with any certainty and, correspondingly, the improvement will not be put to its
optimal use. The defendant's use will be suppressed by the possibility that the
plaintiff might be able to obtain an injunction in the next lawsuit,1 50 or that, be-
cause the defendant's future entries onto the property will be intentional, the
plaintiff could obtain punitive damages next time. Neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant is likely to further improve the property, or to repair the current struc-
ture if it is damaged. This is true whether the encroaching structure is completely
on the plaintiff s property, or whether it merely extends slightly over the parties'
property line.
Likewise, the certainty created by the doctrines of continuing trespass
(in which future damages are awarded and the defendant receives an easement)
and permanent nuisance (in which future damages are awarded) and by the
buy/sell remedy in unjust enrichment cases enables both parties to form plans for
the property, which also makes it more likely that the property is used efficiently.
For this reason, courts in the trespass context have concluded that something
more than the denial of injunctive relief is needed. In Hirshfield v. Schwartz,151
the court noted that the denial of injunctive relief effectively resulted in a "judi-
cially created easement." But "courts are not limited to judicial passivity as in
merely refusing to enjoin an encroachment. Instead, in a proper case, the courts
may exercise their equity powers to affirmatively fashion an interest in the
owner's land which will protect the encroacher's use., 152
149 This is not a calculated risk, but is instead the kind of uncertainty in which the parties face
a great number of possible outcomes and cannot assess all possible results from later litigation and
the probabilities of each possible result. See Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1719, 1724 (2004).
150 Something similar to this occurred in Vandeleigh Industries, a real property easement case
in which the trial court denied the prohibitory injunction, but made clear that, should the plaintiff
later demonstrate an imminent and viable plan to use the property so that its damages from the
forced relinquishment of its right to exclude would become more difficult to quantify, a prohibitory
injunction may issue. Vandeleigh Indus., LLC v. Storage Partners of Kirkwood, LLC, 901 A.2d
91, 96 (Del. 2006).
151 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861, 871 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
152 Id. Thus, it may not be entirely accurate to say that a "court, even when refusing a permanent
injunction, has no such magical power to convert unlawful activity into lawful conduct." Janicke,
supra note 145, at 189.
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The certainty that arises from an ongoing royalty enables the parties to
allocate their resources productively. In the absence of an ongoing royalty, the
infringer will not know what resources it should devote to the products at issue.
Specifically, the infringer cannot know whether future litigation will result in
treble damages for willful infringement or even an injunction against further in-
fringement, making the products perhaps unprofitable or nullifying any potential
investments.153 Similarly, the patentee cannot confidently value its patent rights
or sell the patent rights, nor will it know when future infringement litigation be-
comes worthwhile relative to the resources required in terms of time and
money. 1
54
At the very least, the parties will be forced to periodically expend time
and money on future litigation.155 Moreover, the uncertainty existing in the ab-
sence of a reasonable royalty increases the likelihood of litigation. Litigation
stems from uncertainty-if the plaintiff believes that it is likely to recover treble
damages in the next suit, and the defendant thinks that the plaintiff will recover
damages at the level of only a reasonable royalty, trial is more likely than if both
parties knew what the outcome of the litigation would be. 156 If both parties know
the outcome of the litigation, the chances of settlement increase. 1
57
Historically, courts have said that a plaintiffs legal remedy is not ade-
quate if the plaintiff would be required to file multiple successive lawsuits to
achieve full compensation. 58 There is something intuitively unfair about burden-
153 Even willful infringement does not necessarily require enhanced damages, as the Supreme
Court's majority opinion and Justice Breyer's concurrence in Halo make clear. See Halo Elecs.,
Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933-38 (2016) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("As with any
exercise of discretion, courts should continue to take into account the particular circumstances of
each case in deciding whether to award damages, and in what amount.").
154 Note that future infringement litigation would focus on a damages award; assuming the
product is not meaningfully different, collateral estoppel will bar retrial of infringement or validity.
155 See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 12-CV-00630-LHK, 2014 WL 6687122, at *9
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2014) ("[Alwarding ongoing royalties at this stage may avoid 'an endless
succession of lawsuits presenting the same issue."') (quoting Mark A. Lemley, The Ongoing Con-
fusion Over Ongoing Royalties, 76 Mo. L. REv. 695, 697 (2011)). Curiously, one court thought
that, in setting the ongoing royalty, it should account for the amount that the defendant (but not the
plaintiff) would save by avoiding future litigation. Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. BMW N. Am.,
LLC, 783 F. Supp. 2d 891, 904-05 (E.D. Tex. 2011).
156 See Henry Delcamp, Are Patent Pools a Way to Help Patent Owners Enforce Their Patent
Rights?, 41 INTr'L REv. L. & EcoN. 68, 72 n.29 (2015).
157 Id.
158 See City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 339-40 (1933)
("[T]o oblige the company to bring, from time to time, actions at law for its loss in rental would be
so onerous as to deny to it adequate relief."); Hadley v. Dep't. of Corr., 840 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2005); AM. JuR. 2Dlnjunctions, supra note 39, § 41; BuMP, supra note 49, at 301 ("There
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ing the plaintiff with the obligation to file successive suits to achieve compensa-
tion and, even then, the American Rule means that the plaintiff may be under-
compensated by the amount of its attorneys' fees.1 59 Thus, one of equity's objec-
tives "is to avoid a multiplicity of actions, which might be brought in case only
past damages could be recovered.""16
But, even though the patentee's legal remedy-requiring successive
lawsuits-is not adequate under traditional equitable principles, money may nev-
ertheless be adequate compensation for infringement. As we have seen above,
money may in some cases adequately substitute for the loss of a right to exclude,
at least as long as we can confidently assess the amount required to fully com-
pensate the plaintiff. In such cases, the ongoing royalty enables the court to eq-
uitably alleviate the harm to the plaintiff from the denial of the injunction. It is
thus unsurprising that, in the vast majority of cases awarding an ongoing royalty,
the plaintiff has requested,161 rather than objected to, the award of an ongoing
royalty.
162
2. Burden on the Court
Serial litigation burdens not only the parties, but also the courts. An on-
going royalty, which can avoid the serial litigation, may lessen that burden. Of
course, ongoing royalties can raise new issues that create court burdens, such as
whether a slightly modified product falls within the scope of the court's order for
159 The Patent Act allows for fee shifting in "exceptional cases." 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).
160 Amerman v. Deane, 30 N.E. 741, 742 (N.Y. 1892).
161 Often the patentee requests the award alternatively in case the injunction is denied. E.g.,
Fleming v. Escort, Inc., No. 1:09-CV-105-BLW, 2014 WL 713532, at *4 (D. Idaho Feb. 21,2014),
amended in part by 2014 WL 3445023 (D. Idaho July 11, 2014); WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., No.
11-10374-NMG, 2014 WL 585854, at *1 (D. Mass. Feb. 12, 2014); XpertUniverse, Inc. v. Cisco
Sys., Inc., No. 09-157-RGA, 2013 WL 6118447, at * 12-14 (D. Del. Nov. 20, 2013); CardSoft, Inc.
v. VeriFone Holdings, Inc., No. 2:08-CV-98-RSP, 2013 WL 5862762, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 30,
2013); VimetX Inc. v. Apple Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 816, 847 (E.D. Tex. 2013), affid in part, rev'd
inpart, vacated inpart, 767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014). And sometimes the patentee requests the
award in lieu of seeking prohibitory injunctive relief. E.g., Morpho Detection, Inc. v. Smiths De-
tection Inc., No. 2:11CV498, 2013 WL 5701522, at *8 (E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2013); Syntrix Biosys-
tems, Inc. v. Illumina, Inc., No. C1O-5870 BHS, 2013 WL 3089448, at *2 (W.D. Wash. June 18,
2013). Of course, the patentee might object to the insufficiency of the royalty awarded, but it is
often the patentee who requests the ongoing royalty.
162 The primary exception appears to be Paice, in which the court sua sponte awarded the on-
going royalty in lieu of the injunction, and the plaintiff objected. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.,
504 F.3d 1293, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Occasionally, the plaintiff declines to seek an ongoing roy-
alty, opting instead for a future damages action. E.g., Conceptus, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc., No. C 09-
02280 WHA, 2012 WL 44064, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2012). Nevertheless, in cases in which
uncertainty would cripple the defendant, prudence may suggest a court-ordered ongoing royalty
even if the plaintiff declines to seek one, as in Paice (because the plaintiff can leverage the threat
of potential treble damages in future litigation). Paice, 504 F.3d at 1315.
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ongoing royalties, or whether the defendant has properly accounted for all of its
infringing sales. 163 But, even without an ongoing royalty, these issues would be
the subject of either injunction contempt proceedings or of new litigation.1 64
Thus, the ongoing royalty may reduce the overall judicial burden, since the
awarding court, which is already familiar with the parties, the patent claims, and
the issues, will retain ongoing equity jurisdiction to hear the new issues, which
will not necessarily be the case for later-filed litigation.
1 65
B. Ongoing Royalties Compared to a Lump-Sum Award
There is another alternative to ongoing royalties if injunctive relief is
denied, besides simply leaving the plaintiff to file future suits. The court could
instead award a lump sum amount to compensate the plaintiff for future infringe-
ment.166 Typically, the American legal system awards lump-sum damages to
compensate for future harms from past wrongs. 167 For example, a plaintiff who
is permanently injured can recover future wages that the plaintiff would have
been able to earn but for the injury. 168 The harm (the loss of those wages) has not
yet occurred, although the wrong (the injury-causing conduct) has. In such a case,
the factfinder will be required to determine the salary that the plaintiff would
have earned in the future, accounting for likely raises and promotions, and will
also have to estimate how long the plaintiff likely would have worked. 169 This
requires some prognostication on the factfmder's part. Similarly, the New York
Court of Appeals held that equity could award future damages resulting from the
163 See, e.g., XpertUniverse, Inc., 2013 WL 6118447 at *11 (D. Del. Nov. 20, 2013);
Transamerica Life Ins. Co. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 691 F. Supp. 2d 946, 954 (N.D. Iowa
2010); Creative Internet Advert. Corp. v. Yahoo!, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d 847, 849 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
164 See Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 154 F.3d 1345, 1349
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (discussing district courts' determinations regarding contempt for permanent in-
junction violation with respect to modified products).
165 This helps to explain the categorization of ongoing royalties as a form of equitable relief
since, as Professor Samuel Bray has discussed, equitable remedies can be distinguished from legal
remedies in that they are more likely to require ongoing judicial management. Samuel L. Bray, The
System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REv. 530, 544-45 (2016).
166 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 919 (N.D. Ill. 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also Janicke, supra note 145, at 174-75.
167 See generally Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523 (1983).
168 To arrive at awards of future damages, the factfinder must make certain assumptions about
the world, such as promotions or other raises that the plaintiff would have received, or the inflated
cost of future medical treatment. Id. at 533-41. The ongoing royalty differs materially from these
cases, however, because in the case of an ongoing royalty, the future harm to the plaintiff arises
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breach of a covenant not to build tenement housing, even though no harm to the
plaintiff would occur unless the tenement housing was occupied.17°
Like the ongoing royalty, the lump-sum award for future infringement
would provide the parties with the certainty that they need to order their affairs
going forward. It would also decrease the burden on the court-probably to a
level even less than the ongoing royalty, because court intervention may be re-
quired in the ongoing royalty where the parties dispute whether a particular
change to a product takes it outside of the ongoing royalty order, or whether the
defendant is fully accounting for its sales. 171 For a lump-sum award, the court
may still be involved in the first dispute, but, because the defendant would not
have to account for its infringing sales to the plaintiff, the second dispute would
never arise.
But the lump-sum award has its own drawbacks, primarily with respect
to the adequacy of compensation. First, it requires an additional level of specu-
lation. For either the ongoing royalty or the lump-sum, the factfinder must deter-
mine the proper amount that would adequately compensate the patentee for each
act of infringement. But, in the ongoing royalty context, the court orders the in-
fringer to pay that amount in the future for each act of infringement. In the lump-
sum context, the factfinder must further speculate as to how many times the de-
fendant will infringe in the future.
172
Future infringement will often be tough to predict, and past infringe-
ments may not be a helpful indicator of future infringement for at least two rea-
sons. First, the growth rate could change, and second, the infringer, now that it
knows its product infringes, could attempt to alter the product over time to avoid
infringement. Determining the likely success of the infringer's future research
and development is a particularly speculative enterprise. By unnecessarily forc-
ing this calculation in advance, the lump sum risks substantially overcompensat-
ing the patentee, at the infringer's expense, or substantially undercompensating
the patentee, particularly to the extent we require the plaintiff to prove likely
future infringement with reasonable certainty, so that the risk of failure of proof
falls on the plaintiff. As the Federal Circuit recently noted in a different context,
"using per-unit royalties for measuring the value of use of a technology ... ties
170 Amerman v. Deane, 30 N.E. 741, 742 (N.Y. 1892). Despite the court's talk of awarding
future damages and the speculative harm that might be suffered, the court's measure of damages-
the decrease in the plaintiff's property's value resulting from the tenement buildings being built on
defendant's lot-seems to reflect past damages.
171 See supra Part III.A.2.
172 Drone Techs., Inc. v. Parrot S.A., No. 14CV01 11, 2015 WL 3756318, at *8 (W.D. Pa. June
12, 2015) ("To that end, the jury was not instructed or obliged to award past and future damages
using the same reasonable royalty rate, and its varied rates for damages reflects the difficulty in
determining an appropriate amount of damages, especially where sales have not yet occurred."),
vacated on other grounds, No. 2015-1892, 2016 WL 5439806 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 29, 2016).
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compensation paid to revealed marketplace success, minimizing under- and
over-payment risks from lump-sum payments agreed to in advance."
'17 3
Moreover, a lump sum award forces the defendant to pay now based on
profits it hopes to reap in the future. When the infringer pays after the fact for its
infringing sales, it can be expected to have the funds to pay for the infringement.
But the infringer may not have advance access to the funds required to pay the
lump-sum award, or payment may reduce the level of the infringer's funds in
such a way that it can no longer capitalize on its market opportunities. The on-
going royalty, then, has the advantages of both reducing the risk of inaccurately
compensating the patentee and mitigating the harm to the infringer from pre-sale
lump sums.
IV. DETERMINING ONGOING ROYALTIES
Courts have generally applied the Georgia-Pacific framework to ongo-
ing royalty determinations, asking, in essence, what rate would be agreed upon
in a hypothetical license negotiation between a willing licensee and a willing
patentee.174 For the most part, courts have used the jury's damages verdict as a
starting point,175 but they often adjust the ongoing royalty upward as the result
of one or more of several factors. Some courts adjust the royalty on the belief
that the jury's award is undercompensatory. Other courts adjust the jury award
based on changes in the parties' circumstances or legal status-because the de-
fendant is now an adjudged infringer of a valid patent, these courts believe that
the plaintiff would occupy a stronger bargaining position in the parties' hypo-
thetical negotiation. A related adjustment comes when courts enhance damages
based on the infringer's willfulness-when the infringer sells the patented article
in the future, it will know that the patent is both valid and infringed. Thus, some
courts reason that any future infringement will necessarily be willful, and they
enhance the ongoing royalty on that basis. Below, I consider each one in turn,
drawing on analogies to the real property context.
A. Jury Undercompensation
One of the principles of measuring the remedy in mistaken improver
cases is that an innocent property owner should never be made worse off (net of
173 See Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283, 1304 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
174 See generally Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); see also On Track Innovations Ltd. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 3d 369, 373-407
(S.D.N.Y. 2015); Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512, 517 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Hanson
v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1077-78 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
175 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 12-CV-00630-LHK, 2014 WL 6687122, at *14
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litigation costs) than if the improvement had not occurred. 17 6 Stated differently,
the owner should not be undercompensated for the value of its property.177 Sim-
ilarly, courts declining to award injunctive relief in patent cases should ensure
that the patentee is fully compensated for any ongoing infringement. 178 Anything
less leaves the patentee short of her rightful position and under-deters infringe-
ment. 179 Thus, courts should ensure that an ongoing royalty adequately compen-
sates the patentee, and should resolve any doubt in favor of the patentee.
Courts' tendencies to increase the jury award for post-judgment infringe-
ment might stem from the belief that the jury's reasonable royalty award is un-
der-compensatory because it reflects a patent strength discount-that is, it re-
flects a discount from the value of the patent based on uncertainty about whether
the patent is valid and infringed by the defendant's product. Indeed, many courts
have held that ongoing royalties should be set higher than the jury rate because
the defendant is now an adjudicated infringer of a valid patent. 180 These courts
have reasoned that this change in the legal status of the parties-and in what the
parties would know going into their hypothetical negotiation-would change the
outcome of the hypothetical negotiation from the outcome that the jury deter-
mined. 181 The Federal Circuit has seemingly endorsed this approach, holding that
176 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 50 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
177 See LAYCOCK, supra note 50, at 506.
178 Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 620, 630 (E.D. Tex. 2009) ("[A]n on-
going royalty rate must still adequately compensate a patentee .... That is, the law must ensure
that an adjudged infringer who voluntarily chooses to continue his infringing behavior must ade-
quately compensate the patent holder for using the patent holder's property.").
179 A & H Sportswear Co. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 1457, 1480 (E.D. Pa.
1997) (trademark case stating "[t]he ambiguities in fashioning relief based on a reasonable royalty
require 'a court to take special care to ensure that the royalty payment has not undercompensated
the victim [so that] the malefactor, and not the victim, bears the burden of any uncertainty in its
calculation."' (quoting Sands, Taylor & Wood v. Quaker Oats Co., 34 F.3d 1340, 1351 (7th Cir.
1994))), rev'd on other grounds, 166 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
180 E.g., Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 670 F.3d 1171, 1193 (Fed.
Cir. 2012), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 682 F.3d 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Paice, 609 F. Supp. 2d
at 630 ("[T]he fact that [the defendant] is an adjudged infringer who chooses to continue infringing
simply cannot be ignored."); Tomita Techs. USA, LLC v. Nintendo Co., No. 11 Civ. 4256(JSR),
2013 WL 6504394, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2013) ("[A]fter a finding of infringement[,]... the
status of the parties has changed, as would the result of the hypothetical negotiation between
them.").
181 See Morpho Detection, Inc. v. Smiths Detection Inc., No. 2:1 lcv498, 2013 WL 5701522, at
*9 (E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2013) ("Morpho offers a compelling argument that after the jury found Mor-
pho's patent valid and found that Smiths' commercialized product infringed on Morpho's patent,
Morpho was in a far superior bargaining position than it was in more than a year earlier, the date
the jury relied on in affixing the pre-verdict royalty rate at $7,500. Notably, at this earlier date,
Smiths not only had a reasonable basis to argue that its product was non-infringing, but clearly
believed, as demonstrated by its vehement arguments throughout this case, that Morpho's patent
was invalid as anticipated and/or invalid as obvious based on prior art.").
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the patentee's bargaining position "is even stronger" after findings of validity
and infringement.1
82
And there may be good reason for concern that the jury award is under-
compensatory, given the risk of over-reliance on existing license agreements.
Existing licenses are among the strongest evidence that juries use in setting the
reasonable royalty, 183 but these licenses almost always reflect considerations not
tied to the value of the patented invention. 184 Actual licenses are negotiated in
the shadow of probable litigation outcomes, meaning that the parties to a license
negotiation will necessarily take into account the likelihood that the patent would
be found to be valid and infringed, as well as the likely litigation expenses nec-
essary to reach the legal outcome. 185 Given that the parties negotiating a license
will rarely, if ever, be absolutely certain that the patent would be held valid and
infringed if litigated, a voluntary license agreement will almost always incorpo-
rate some patent strength discount. 186 And, if juries rely too heavily on such an
existing license in setting the reasonable royalty, the reasonable royalty will like-
wise reflect a patent strength discount. 87
On the other hand, existing licenses may reflect not only a patent strength
discount, but also a switching costs kicker, at least if the parties believed that a
court might enjoin infringement if the parties litigated the issue.' 88 Thus, existing
license rates are a function of the downward pressure of patent strength discounts
and the upward pressure of switching costs, as well as other considerations, such
as litigation expenses. 189 Consequently, there is reason to suspect that jury
awards may not perfectly compensate the plaintiff, at least where they rely on
existing licenses.190
But that is a problem that should be remedied by attorneys and experts
emphasizing to the jury the non-value aspects of existing patent licenses and the
assumptions that should go into the reasonable royalty determination. Moreover,
182 ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
183 See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Catalyst Research Corp., 547 F. Supp. 401, 415 (D. Minn.
1982).
184 In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp. 1354,
1379 (N.D. I1. 1993); see also Brunswick Corp. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 204, 212 (Fed. Cl.
1996), aff'd, 152 F.3d 946 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
185 In re Mahurkar, 831 F. Supp. at 1379.
186 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REv.
1991, 2019-20 (2007).
187 Jonathan S. Masur, The Use and Misuse of Patent Licenses, 110 Nw. U. L. REv. 115, 131-
32 (2015).
188 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 186, at 2022.
189 See Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am. Inc., 860 F. Supp. 1448, 1452-53 (C.D. Cal.
1993); see also supra text accompanying note 130 (discussing average litigation expenses).
190 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 186, at 2021.
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as many courts have pointed out in response to arguments about the patentee's
"even stronger" bargaining position, juries are instructed that the reasonable roy-
alty should reflect the license that would have been negotiated between a willing
patentee and willing licensee who believed the patent to be valid and infringed,19 '
so that the reasonable royalty should not incorporate a patent strength discount.
1 92
Once the parties have presented their competing experts-who will undoubtedly
explain to the jury why a given license does not necessarily reflect the value of
the patented invention-and once the jury has been instructed to assume validity
and infringement in calculating the reasonable royalty, the court should not, as
part of its determination of the ongoing royalty, reevaluate the jury's determina-
tion based on factors the jury was previously instructed to consider. As Professor
Mark A. Lemley put it, "There is no reason to think that asking the same question
twice should produce different answers in most cases."' 93 Thus, unless the jury
verdict itself is subject to attack under traditional principles (e.g., judgment as a
matter of law, motion for a new trial), the ongoing royalty should generally re-
flect the jury's verdict. 194
191 SimpleAir, Inc. v. Google Inc., 77 F. Supp. 3d 569, 573 (E.D. Tex. 2014), vacatedsub nom.,
820 F.3d 419 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
192 Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Varian Med. Sys., Inc., No. 08CV1307, 2012 WL 1436569, at *11
(W.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2012) ("Thus, all that has occurred since the damages portion of the trial is that
the jury and/or the Court confirmed what the jury was to assume for that portion of the trial."),
aff'd in part, vacated in part, 561 F. App'x 934 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Presidio Components Inc. v. Am.
Tech. Ceramics Corp., No. 08-CV-335-IEG NLS, 2010 WL 3070370, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5,
2010) (footnote omitted) ("Where, as here, an injunction is no longer proper, the Court is hard
pressed to find in what material respect the situation is different now than it was during trial. In
determining the reasonable royalty rate during trial, both parties assumed the '356 patent was valid
and infringed."), aff'd in part, vacated inpart, 702 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Ariba, Inc. v. Emp-
toris, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 914, 918 (E.D. Tex. 2008); Cummins-Allison Corp. v. SBM Co., 584
F. Supp. 2d 916, 918 (E.D. Tex. 2008); Orion IP, LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No.
6:05CV322, 2008 WL 8856865, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2008).
193 Lemley, supra note 155, at 704.
194 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 919 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (citing Amado v.
Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 757 F.3d
1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014), overruled by Williamson v. Citrix Online LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2015)). Judge Posner rightly recognized that, in most cases, the jury verdict should provide the
ongoing royalty. Judge Posner gave a nod to the Federal Circuit's holding in Amado "that the
retrospective reasonable royalty (damages 'going backward') should be lower than the prospective
royalty ('going forward') to reflect the parties' greater certainty in the latter case-infringement
having been determined by a court and not merely claimed by the patentee." Apple, Inc., 869 F.
Supp. 2d at 919. This, he says, "is consistent with the proposition that the forward royalty is an
injunction substitute, so not really damages." Id. But he earlier pointed out that injunctions are, in
essence, compensatory, and not meant to be punitive. Id. at 917.
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B. Changes in Circumstances and Status: Switching Costs
Although circumstances such as market conditions may sometimes
change between the time of the hypothetical negotiation and the award of an
ongoing royalty, necessitating a change in the royalty rate, 195 neither of the two
most common "changed circumstances" that courts rely on in enhancing ongoing
royalties are valid considerations. The first-the finding of infringing and non-
invalidity-is discussed above. But the second-the infringer's switching
costs-bears further discussion.
By the time of trial, the infringer likely would face switching costs that
it would not have faced at the time of the first hypothetical negotiation (that is,
just before the infringement began). The first hypothetical negotiation comes at
a time when the infringer would have to prospectively select between the pa-
tented product or process and a non-infringing alternative, while the second
comes at a time where the infringer will have to switch from the patented product
or process to a non-infringing alternative.
Some courts have suggested that the ongoing royalty should award the
patentee more than the market value of the patented invention by incorporating
these switching costs into the calculus. For example, in Paice LLC v. Toyota
Motor Corp.,196 although the court initially suggested that the ongoing royalty
should be compensatory, 197 it went on to suggest that switching costs should be
included in the ongoing royalty calculation: "In a post-judgment negotiation,
where the licensee is an adjudged infringer and continues to willfully infringe by
choice, the cost of switching to an alternative design is a factor that the parties
would consider in arriving at an appropriate ongoing royalty rate. 198
195 The hypothetical negotiation for a reasonable royalty occurs before any infringement takes
place. Wordtech Sys., Inc. v. Integrated Networks Sols., Inc., 609 F.3d 1308, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Arguably post-infringement changes in the market or in the patent's value could be considered
under the "book of wisdom" rubric discussed in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process
Co., 289 U.S. 689, 698 (1933). See Soverain Software LLC v. J.C. Penney Corp., 899 F. Supp. 2d
574, 588-89 (E.D. Tex. 2012), rev'd sub nom., Soverain Software LLC v. Victoria's Secret Direct
Brand Mgmt., LLC, 778 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Lemley, supra note 155, at 706. But the "book
of wisdom" concept has been of little use in most cases. See Aqua Shield v. Inter Pool Cover Team,
774 F.3d 766, 772 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
196 609 F. Supp. 2d 620 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
197 Id. at 624 ("In many ongoing royalty negotiations, the threat of a permanent injunction
serves as a big stick, essentially framing negotiation in terms of how much an adjudged infringer
would pay for a license to continue its infringing conduct[,]" but "when an injunction is not proper
under eBay, the question instead becomes: what amount of money would reasonably compensate
a patentee for giving up his right to exclude?").
198 Id. at 627.
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Similarly, in Boston Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson,1 99 the court
indicated that the ongoing royalty should be set at a rate that reflects the pa-
tentee's potential to opportunistically leverage an injunction, even though the
court had denied the injunction. 200 The court stated that, in assessing ongoing
royalties, "it must assume that the jury finding of liability in this case would have
strengthened [the patentee's] bargaining position had the parties negotiated a li-
cense after the jury verdict" because of "the parties' knowledge that [the pa-
tentee] could have forced [the infringer's] product off the market" until the patent
expired.20 1 In other words, the court, after finding that an injunction was not war-
ranted, engaged in a fiction that suggests that the parties would believe that the
alternative to an agreement in the hypothetical negotiation was exclusion through
an injunction.20 2 The Boston Scientific court believed that to not consider switch-
ing costs would require "the Court to assume that a jury verdict [of infringement]
in a patent case has no meaning. 20 3 This position has also been staked out by
commentators, who have claimed that factfinders should consider "what the in-
fringer would pay to avoid a future injunction" because, to do otherwise is to
"completely eviscerate[]" the patent holder's statutory right to exclude.2 °4
Certainly with respect to the original hypothetical negotiation, the parties
to the negotiation should assume that, in the absence of agreement, the defend-
ant's only alternative is non-use of the patent.2°5 This helps to identify the market
value of the patent by comparing the patented invention with non-infringing al-
ternatives before the defendant sinks money into a particular design.20 6 Thus, the
Federal Circuit has noted,
[that a] key inquiry in the analysis is what it would have been
worth to the defendant, as it saw things at the time, to obtain the
authority to use the patented technology, considering the benefits
it would expect to receive from using the technology and the al-
ternatives it might have pursued.20 7
199 No. C 02-00790 SI, 2009 WL 975424 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2009).
200 Id. at *2.
201 Id. at *5.
202 Id. at *4.
203 Id. at *3.
204 Ronald J. Schutz & Patrick M. Arenz, Uncharted Waters: Determining Ongoing Royalties
for Victorious Patent Holders Denied an Injunction, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 75, 82 (2010).
205 See J. Gregory Sidak, Bargaining Power and Patent Damages, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REv. l,
16(2015).
206 See Riles v. Shell Expl. & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("The economic
relationship between the patented method and non-infringing alternative methods, of necessity,
would limit the hypothetical negotiation."); Sidak, supra note 205, at 15.
207 Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
see Aqua Shield v. Inter Pool Cover Team, 774 F.3d 766, 772 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("[A]nticipated
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No switching costs are included in this formulation because the hypothetical ne-
gotiation occurs before the defendant's infringement began.2 °8 In Boston Scien-
tific and Paice, however, the courts' analyses posit that the hypothetical negoti-
ation taking place after the jury verdict 09 should assume (fictitiously) that the
patentee can remove the infringer's product from the market, thus incorporating
switching costs into the equation.210
This analysis begs the question. By suggesting that the ongoing royalty
ought to incorporate switching costs (or by imposing the "undefinable kicker"
above market value as discussed by Calabresi and Melamed),211 the court as-
sumes that the patentee's right to exclude should be protected by a property rule
rather than a liability rule. But that is the very question at issue in these cases.212
Calabresi and Melamed argue that, in a case where negotiation theoretically
would be possible but holdout problems increase transaction costs in a way that
makes a market solution unlikely, a liability rule (that is, damages at market
value) is appropriate. 213 They use the example of permanent nuisance,21 4 but their
reasoning also applies to the infringer's post-judgment infringement.
We could use a property rule to encourage a negotiated market solution,
but, as discussed above,215 the patentee who believes that it can obtain injunctive
relief will likely engage in opportunistic behavior in order to capitalize on the
defendant's switching costs, making a negotiated market solution unlikely. In
such a scenario, Calabresi and Melamed argue for the use of a liability rule.216
Use of a liability rule does not eviscerate the owner's property right any more
incremental profits ... [above the next-best non-infringing alternative] are conceptually central to
constraining the royalty negotiation.").
208 Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("The key
element in setting a reasonable royalty ... is the necessity for return to the date when the infringe-
ment began." (quoting Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th Cir.
1978))).
209 Boston Sci. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, No. C 02-00790 SI, 2009 WL 975424, at * 1 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 9, 2009) ("[T]he Court directed the parties to assume that they had negotiated a license
on October 31, 2007, the date the jury returned a special verdict in favor of Cordis.").
210 See generally Presidio Components Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., No. 08-CV-335-IEG
NLS, 2010 WL 3070370, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2010) ("Where, as here, an injunction is no
longer proper, the Court is hard pressed to find in what material respect the situation is different
now than it was during trial."), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 702 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
211 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 113, at 1126.
212 See Epstein, supra note 14, at 2096 (noting that, even in the case of what appears to be a
liability rule, "courts can use the calculation of damages to reinstitute a de facto property rule.").
213 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 113, at 1127.
214 Id.
215 See supra Part II.B.2.i.
216 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 113, at 1127.
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than use of a liability rule for property damage in the case of a car accident evis-
cerates the owner's property right; indeed, it is only because of the property right
that the plaintiff recovers anything. Instead, in these cases, the debate is whether
to enforce the right through a liability rule or a property rule given the competing
concerns at hand. And the answer to that question depends in part on the blame-
worthiness and inefficiency of the infringer's conduct, which will be discussed
in the next section.
C. Willfulness Enhancement
Closely related to the idea of adjusting the ongoing royalty because the
patent has been held valid and infringed is an adjustment of the ongoing royalty
as a measure of "enhanced damages., 217 Enhanced damages are authorized for
some willful infringements under the Patent Act.218 The enhanced damages avail-
able under the Patent Act are a legal remedy, and they do not directly apply to
ongoing royalties, because the Federal Circuit has categorized ongoing royalties
as an equitable remedy.21 9 Nevertheless, some courts have applied enhanced-
damages principles, resting largely on willfulness, to ongoing royalties. Willful-
ness enhancements have been analyzed using nine factors articulated in the Fed-
eral Circuit's opinion in Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc.22°
217 See, e.g., Morpho Detection, Inc. v. Smiths Detection Inc., No. 2:11CV498, 2013 WL
5701522, at *8-9 (E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2013) (awarding ongoing royalties at 25% above the jury
verdict based on the parties' "changed legal status," and noting that the patentee had not requested
enhanced damages but that, had enhanced damages been requested, the court would have enhanced
them by the same 25%); DataTreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 2:06-CV-72 DF, 2011 WL
8810604, at *19 n.3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2011) ("Alternatively, if the Court were to consider...
enhancement analysis under Read.. . the Court would nonetheless reach the same ongoing royalty
rate." (citation omitted)).
218 Section 284 does not provide a limiting standard for enhanced damages, see 35 U.S.C. §
284 (2012), but Federal Circuit judicial gloss has in the past limited enhancements to willful in-
fringement. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007), abrogated by
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). In Halo, the Supreme Court left open
the possibility that enhanced damages could conceivably be warranted in some other set of cases
of "egregious cases of culpable behavior." Id. at 1932. It held that enhanced damages "should
generally be reserved for egregious cases typified by willful misconduct." Id. at 1934.
219 See Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2007). But see Lem-
ley, supra note 155, at 697 (suggesting that ongoing royalties might be justified as an award of
future damages under § 284).
220 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992), superseded on other grounds as recognized by Bard
Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 670 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The factors
are: (1) "whether the infringer deliberately copied"; (2) the infringer's investigation and good-faith
belief of invalidity or non-infringement; (3) the infringer's litigation behavior; (4) the infringer's
"size and financial condition"; (5) "[c]loseness of the case"; (6) "[d]uration of defendant's miscon-
duct"; (7) "[r]emedial action by the defendant"; (8) "[d]efendant's motivation for harm"; and (9)
attempts to conceal infringement. Id. (citations omitted). These considerations seem to fit well with
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The verdict of validity and infringement means that future acts of in-
fringement by the defendant will be willful in the patent sense. 221 Consequently,
many courts have set the ongoing royalty rate higher than the jury verdict rate,
on the theory that the rate should be "enhanced" because any post-judgment in-
fringement is necessarily willful. 222 As the Supreme Court recently noted, how-
ever, and as Justice Breyer's concurrence emphasized, enhancement is not re-
quired "simply because the evidence shows that the infringer knew about the
patent and nothing more. '2 23 Instead, "[a]s with any exercise of discretion, courts
should continue to take into account the particular circumstances of each case in
deciding whether to award [enhanced] damages .... 224
1. Enhancement in Traditional Property Contexts
In mistaken improver, encroachment, and nuisance cases, courts do not
award supracompensatory damages. In order for the court to deny injunctive re-
lief and to, in some cases, order a forced exchange, it usually will have found
that the defendant was not an intentional wrongdoer, at least at the beginning of
the disputed conduct.225 Of course, as is the case in the patent realm, once the
court denies injunctive relief, if the defendant continues to access the property,
then any trespass would be intentional in the sense that the defendant knowingly
226entered the plaintiff's property. But courts have not awarded punitive damages
the Supreme Court's decision in Halo, which struck down the Federal Circuit's Seagate test. See
generally Halo, 136 S. Ct. 1923.
221 WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., No. 11-10374-NMG, 2014 WL 585854, at *9 (D. Mass. Feb.
12, 2014) ("Many district courts have therefore set the post-verdict rate higher than the pre-verdict
rate based on the fact that the post-verdict infringer knows that it is infringing and the post-verdict
patentee has a strong claim to enhanced damages should it abandon the hypothetical royalty nego-
tiations and pursue a patent infringement lawsuit."); Soverain Software LLC v. J.C. Penney Corp.,
899 F. Supp. 2d 574, 590 (E.D. Tex. 2012), rev'd sub nom., Soverain Software LLC v. Victoria's
Secret Direct Brand Mgmt., LLC, 778 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Mondis Tech. Ltd. v. Chimei
InnoLux Corp., 822 F. Supp. 2d 639, 645-46 (E.D. Tex. 2011), aft'd, 530 F. App'x 959 (Fed. Cir.
2013); Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. BMW N. Am., LLC, 783 F. Supp. 2d 891, 899 (E.D. Tex.
2011); I/P Engine, Inc. v. AOL Inc., No. 2:11 CV512, 2014 WL 309245, at *4 (E.D. Va. Jan. 28,
2014).
222 See WBIP, LLC, 2014 WL 585854, at *8; Soverain Software LLC, 899 F. Supp. 2d at 590;
Mondis Tech. Ltd., 822 F. Supp. 2d at 645-46; Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 902
("Given the willful nature of the ongoing infringement and the fact that a new lawsuit could po-
tentially result in an award of treble damages, the court will consider the factors traditionally taken
into account when determining whether to enhance a past damages award upon a finding of will-
fulness."); I/P Engine, Inc., 2014 WL 309245, at *4.
223 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1936 (Breyer, J., concurring).
224 Id. at 1933 (majority opinion).
225 See supra Part II.B.2.iv.
226 That is, unless the court orders an easement, a forced exchange, or some other form of relief.
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in these cases. Instead, compensation for the plaintiff has been set at market
value.227
For example, in City ofHarrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Manufacturing
Co., the Supreme Court found a nuisance, but, noting the disproportionate hard-
ship to the defendant and the public that would result from an injunction, the
Court ordered payment at the value of the plaintiffs land's depreciation.228 In
Proctor v. Huntington,229 the Washington Supreme Court affirmed a judgment
denying an injunction in a mistaken improvement case and assessing damages at
the fair market value of the land. In Knuth v. Vogels,23 ° in which the defendant's
garage encroached on the plaintiffs property, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
gave the owner the election of whether to sell the encroached portion of the prop-
erty to the defendant for fair market value or to remain the owner and recover
damages for past and future trespass for the expected life of the encroaching gar-
age, subject to an order enjoining the property owner from filing later suits over
the encroaching garage.
In Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,231 the plaintiffs argued that damages
should not be assessed at fair market value, because that would give the defend-
ants the power of private eminent domain. Instead, the plaintiffs sought damages
at the "amount that a private corporation would have to pay where it needs such
servitude to continue in operation as against a seller who is unwilling to sell his
land. 2 32 In other words, the Boomer plaintiffs sought damages reflecting the de-
fendant' s switching costs, just as the Boston Scientific court held that the ongoing
royalty could reflect patentee opportunism predicated on switching costs. 233 In
Boomer, however, the court recognized that the plaintiff was "[s]imply... ask-
ing for punitive damages.. .," and declined to adopt such a standard, given that
it did not believe "that the wrong complained of [was] morally culpable, or [was]
227 See Wacker v. Price, 216 P.2d 707, 712 (Ariz. 1950); Goldbacher v. Eggers, 76 N.Y.S. 881,
885 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1902); Crocker v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 70 N.Y.S. 492,495, 500 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1901); Dobbs, supra note 71, at 348, 367 (permanent damages for encroaching structure
should be measured "by the value of the land taken"). But cf Owenson v. Bradley, 197 N.W. 885,
889 (N.D. 1924) (noting that value of encroached property "does not exceed $250," that the en-
croacher "is apparently willing to pay a liberal award of damages," and setting damages at $125,
apparently without determining actual value of the encroached portion); Methodist Episcopal
Soc'y v. Akers, 46 N.E. 381, 383 (Mass. 1897) (ordering payment of $225 for portions of land
without explaining the basis for the award).
228 City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 339-40 (1933).
229 238 P.3d 1117 (Wash. 2010).
230 61 N.W.2d 301, 304-05 (Wis. 1953).
231 Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 340 N.Y.S.2d 97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972).
232 Id. at 100.
233 See supra Part III.B.
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actuated by evil and reprehensible motives., 23 4 The final award was compensa-
tory-it was determined by awarding the decrease in the property's market value
as a result of the nuisance.235
In the trade secret context, in which the Uniform Trade Secrets Act per-
mits an ongoing royalty for use by innocent defendants, the ongoing royalty is
not enhanced for the defendant's intentional misappropriation going forward.23 6
This is true even though the UTSA permits exemplary damages in cases of "will-
ful and malicious misappropriation., 237 And, drawing on analogies to trade secret
law as well as patent law, a court in a trademark case awarded an ongoing royalty
at the "reasonable royalty" rate without enhancing it, although it rightly meas-
ured the ongoing royalty to "resolve[] all uncertainties [about the adequacy of
the compensation] in favor of Plaintiffs.2 38
Any defense of the enhancement of ongoing royalties must distinguish
the patent context from these other contexts to explain why enhancement is ap-
propriate in one and not the other.239 As the Supreme Court said long ago,
[T]here is no good reason why taking a man's property in an
invention should be trebly punished, while the measure of dam-
ages as to other property is single and actual damages. [W]here
the injury is wanton or malicious, a jury may inflict vindictive
or exemplary damages, not to recompense the plaintiff, but to
punish the defendant.24 °
One distinction is that, in the real property context, encroachment may
be relatively easy to spot. (This is not always the case, but it often will be.) In the
patent context, infringement 'may go undetected for years. Perhaps, then, en-
hanced ongoing royalties are awarded out of concern that the infringer will at-
234 Boomer, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 100-01 (internal quotation omitted).
235 Kinley v. At. Cement Co., 349 N.Y.S.2d 199, 201 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973).
236 See, e.g., Cacique, Inc. v. Robert Reiser & Co., 169 F.3d 619, 624 (9th Cir. 1999); Skycam,
LLC v. Bennett, No. 09-CV-294-GKF-FHM, 2012 WL 4483610, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 27,
2012); Elec. Data Sys. Corp. v. Heinemann, 493 S.E.2d 132, 135 (Ga. 1997). See generally Bianco
v. Globus Med., Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 929, 937-38 (E.D. Tex. 2014) (declining to enhance ongoing
royalty in trade secret case, but distinguishing patent cases).
237 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1985).
238 A & H Sportswear Co. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 1457, 1477 (E.D. Pa.
1997), rev'd on other grounds, 166 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
239 Under the 19th-century Mill Acts, the statutes allowed the building of dams that caused
upstream flooding of surrounding land. Before the dams were built, the builders were obligated to
pay for the land that would be flooded at a premium of fifty percent above market. See Epstein,
supra note 14, at 2114-15.
240 Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 488-89 (1854).
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tempt to conceal its infringement-that is, after all, one of the factors for en-
hanced damages under § 284.241 But this would be reflected in the court's deci-
sion of whether or not to balance the hardships to the parties in granting or deny-
ing injunctive relief-if the defendant concealed its infringement, it likely would
not be able to benefit from a balancing of the hardships.242 Moreover, the con-
cealed infringement will be past infringement, and, if it is found to be willful, it
would be subject to enhanced damages for the past infringement.243 The defend-
ant likely will not be able to conceal its future infringement-courts awarding
ongoing royalties generally order a periodic accounting by the defendant.244 If
the defendant conceals infringement from the accounting or from the patentee's
audit, it will be subject to contempt sanctions for violating the court's order.
It is also the case that, because of the non-rivalrous nature of intellectual
property, the law can use something less extreme than the buy/sell remedy that
is sometimes necessary with real property. The real property owner subjected to
the forced exchange not only loses her own right to exclude others (including the
builder) from the property, but she herself becomes subject to some degree of
exclusion by the other party.24 5 The remedy in the patent context is less drastic
because although the plaintiff cannot enforce her right to exclude this particular
defendant with a property rule, the plaintiff retains the right to use the patented
invention herself, (that is, the infringer is not granted a right to exclude) and she
retains the ability to exclude others.246 But it is not obvious that this distinction
should matter in the decision of whether to enhance damages or not-it does not,
for example, make the infringer's ongoing trespass any more culpable than it
would be in the real property context.
241 See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
242 See generally Sigma Chem. Co. v. Harris, 586 F. Supp. 704, 711 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (finding,
in preliminary injunction context, that equities did not favor defendant who breached restrictive
covenant and attempted to conceal breach), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 794 F.2d 371 (8th Cir.
1986); Gold v. Holiday Rent-A-Car Int'l, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 280, 283 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (same for
breach of covenant not to compete).
243 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012); In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007),
abrogated by Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).
244 See, e.g., Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293,1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Carnegie
Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., No. 09-290, 2014 WL 1320154, at *39 (W.D. Pa. Mar.
31, 2014), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, vacated in part, 807 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (ongoing
royalties affirmed).
245 See Hirshfield v. Schwartz, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861, 871 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (discussing
court's ability to grant affirmative relief to mistaken builder).
246 The ability to implement a less drastic remedy in patent cases may counsel in favor of re-
moving the plaintiff-favoring thumb from the scale in balancing the parties' hardships in the patent
context. See supra notes 44-47.
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2. Enhancement in the Patent Context
The jury in a patent case sometimes concludes that the parties in a hypo-
thetical negotiation would have agreed to a fully paid up lump sum royalty for
the defendant's license rather than a running royalty that the defendant would
pay based on sales of products incorporating the patented invention.247 In these
cases, the plaintiff will have no remedy for the defendant's future acts of in-
fringement, under the theory that the plaintiff has already been compensated for
them.248 Lump-sum award cases, like ongoing royalty cases, effectively immun-
ize the defendant from future lawsuits based on its ongoing use of the patented
invention.249 In these cases, however, courts do not enhance the award on the
ground that any future use of the patent by the defendant necessarily constitutes
willful infringement.25 °
No court that has enhanced an ongoing royalty on future willfulness
grounds has articulated any reason that ongoing royalties should be enhanced on
this basis while lump-sum awards should not. In fact, no court seems even to
have taken notice of this inconsistency. The lump-sum award should, in theory,
fully compensate the patentee for the defendant's future use of the patent, 251 but
that is also true of an unenhanced ongoing royalty. In the lump-sum reasonable
royalty context, courts intuitively recognize that there is no need to enhance the
fully compensatory award for the defendant's future infringement, but they fail
to apply this same reasoning in the context of an ongoing royalty. The defend-
ant's ability to convince a jury that the parties would have agreed to a lump-sum
royalty instead of a running royalty does not change the culpability of the de-
fendant's prospective infringement.
247 See Pers. Audio, LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 9:09CV1 11, 2011 WL 3269330, at *4 (E.D. Tex.
July 29, 2011) (collecting cases). These awards have received some criticism. See generally Barry
Ungar, The Paid-in-Full, Lump-Sum Damage Award: A Perversion of Georgia-Pacific, Lucent v.
Gateway and the Right to Exclude, 41 AIPLA Q.J. 205 (2013).
248 See Pers. Audio, LLC, 2011 WL 3269330, at *8.
249 In lump-sum cases, this may be true even where the defendant introduces new products
using the patented invention. Id. at *4. In this way, the lump sum cases differ from ongoing royalty
cases, which should be limited to the product at issue and merely colorable variations.
250 See, e.g., Fleming v. Escort, Inc., No. CV 09-105-S-BLW, 2013 WL 1290418, at *3 (D.
Idaho Mar. 27, 2013); Fleming v. Escort, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-066-BLW, 2013 WL 3995259, at *I-
2 (D. Idaho Aug. 5, 2013) (finding that $750,000 jury award represented a lump-sum, paid-up
award); Pers. Audio, LLC, 2011 WL 3269330, at *8.
251 See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 67 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
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Enhancement, as a form of punitive damages,252 is intended to punish
and deter.253 Enhancement is reserved for "egregious cases typified by willful
misconduct., 254 Thus, a court enhancing the ongoing royalty should identify the
morally culpable behavior that it seeks to punish,255 or the inefficient behavior
that it seeks to deter. 6 In cases where an injunction would impose heavy switch-
ing costs on an innocent (or relatively innocent) defendant, the court will have
determined that the balance of equities supports defendant's continued use of the
patented invention rather than an injunction.257 Presumably, the court would not
take that approach if the defendant's conduct were considered morally culpable
or repugnant to our sense of decency, or if the defendant's future infringement
ought to be deterred. 8 Interestingly, one 1861 case, discussing in dicta the rea-
sons to deny an injunction that was sought "as an execution or for extortion,"
said that a "court of equity can inflict no exemplary or punitive damages as a
court of law may., 259
252 SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
("[E]nhanced damages are not compensatory but punitive."). There is some suggestion that en-
hanced damages may serve a compensatory purpose, at least in some cases, such as where the
judge feels that the jury undercompensated the patentee. See 7-20 CHISUM ON PATENTS §
20.03(4)(b)(iii) (2015). But, in the ongoing royalty context, there is no reason to additionally com-
pensate the plaintiff under the guise of enhanced damages, because the trial judge sets the ongoing
royalty as an equitable remedy. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1315-16 (Fed.
Cir. 2007); see also supra Part IV.A.
253 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1928-29 (2016); SRIInt'l, 127 F.3d
at 1468.
254 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1934. (emphasizing willful misconduct, rather than merely willful in-
fringement).
255 In Affinity Labs, the court described the ongoing infringement as culpable despite pre-trial
good-faith reliance on an attorney non-infringement opinion, because the good faith "would be
relevant to the [infringer's] culpability with respect to pre-verdict infringement" but "carries little
to no weight with respect to ongoing post-judgment infringement .... Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC
v. BMW N. Am., LLC, 783 F. Supp. 2d 891, 902-03 (E.D. Tex. 2011). The court did not explain
why the future infringement would be culpable, other than that it was "willful," nor did the court
discuss its reasons for denying the plaintiffs request for an injunction. See id. at 896.
256 See generally Sepulveda v. Burnside, 432 F. App'x 860, 865 n.4 (1 1th Cir. 2011) (per cu-
riam) (courts assessing punitive damages should identify state's interest in deterring relevant con-
duct and degree of reprehensibility of conduct). Compare Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC, 783 F. Supp.
2d at 899 (stating that the court should consider "[g]eneral deterrence of infringing activity," and
determine an amount "that reduces the defendant's profit motive to infringe and serves to deter
infringing conduct in general"), with Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Varian Med. Sys., Inc., No.
08CV1307, 2012 WL 1436569, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2012) (declining to enhance ongoing
royalties on willfulness grounds), affd in part, vacated in part, 561 F. App'x 934 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
257 See supra Part II.B.2.
258 Other mechanisms, such as an injunction with a sunset period, or perhaps an ongoing royalty
on an increasing scale, would serve that purpose.
259 Sanders v. Logan, 21 F. Cas. 321, 323 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1861) (No. 12,295).
[Vol. 119
42
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 119, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 12
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol119/iss1/12
ENHANCED ONGOING ROYALTIES
Similarly, economic theory suggests that overcompensating the plaintiff
at defendant's expense would be inefficient rather than efficient, at least in cases
where the defendant did not intentionally bypass the market and help itself to the
plaintiff s property.2 60 The defendant will have to pass those costs on to custom-
ers, or will produce less of the product than it would at the optimal price. 61
When an injunction would impose a great burden on the defendant,
would allow the patentee to command a royalty based on the defendant's switch-
ing costs rather than the value of the patent, and would not significantly benefit
the plaintiff, there seems little reason to enhance an ongoing royalty under a will-
fulness determination.262 But when the Supreme Court's eBay constrictions re-
quire the denial of injunctive relief in a case of intentional wrongdoing by the
defendant, the situation is altogether different. In a case in which the prohibitory
injunction is denied, not because of the equities, but instead only because of the
default preference for money damages, the defendant's continued infringement
may very well be the kind of infringement for which enhancement is appropri-
ate.263
In that situation, the reasonable royalty award for past infringement will
often be enhanced, and, regardless, there may be good reason to enhance future
damages. The reason to award an ongoing royalty instead of leaving the plaintiff
to future suits in such cases will be to protect the plaintiff from the time and
expense of filing multiple successive lawsuits (and, perhaps, from the infringer's
capitalizing on those costs to negotiate a settlement below the level of harm that
its infringement causes). That purpose for the ongoing royalty is not inhibited by
the award of enhanced damages and, in fact, would be hindered without an en-
hancement, since the plaintiff would likely recover enhanced damages in future
litigation.
260 See Joanna M. Shepherd, Ideal Versus Reality in Third-Party Litigation Financing, 8 J.L.
ECON. & POL'Y 593, 610 (2012) ("[P]rolonged overcompensation leads to over-deterrence-waste-
ful, inefficient defensive actions by potential defendants that fail to provide significant social ben-
efits.").
261 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 186, at 2012 n.43 ("Of course, in practice, higher royalty
burdens will lead to higher prices and reduced output, with associated deadweight loss.").
262 In one notable case, the court awarded ongoing royalties at the jury rate despite finding
willfulness and enhancing pre-judgment damages by 23%. Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech.
Grp., Ltd., No. 09-290, 2014 WL 1320154, at *38-39 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2014) rev'd in part,
vacated in part, 807 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The willfulness finding was later reversed on
appeal, although the ongoing royalty rate was affirmed. Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech.
Grp., Ltd., 807 F. 3d 1283, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
263 Laycock suggests that this type of case does not--or at least should not-exist. See Douglas
Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REv. 687, 692 (1990). And, in
fact, it may make little sense to deny a prohibitory injunction on the grounds of the absence of
irreparable injury, if the irreparable injury rule serves only or primarily to express a preference for
remedies that do not require ongoing judicial supervision, see generally Bray, supra note 165, at
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One example of such a case is Internet Machines LLC v. Alienware
Corp. ,264 in which the court noted that the defendant claimed that it could cease
infringement within three months of a final, nonappealable judgment, suggesting
that the defendant's hardship from an injunction would not have been significant.
In that case, the court enhanced the post-judgment royalty rate by increasing it
50% over the jury's rate.
If the injunction is denied primarily because of the public interest, rather
than as a result of balancing the hardships to the parties, enhancement may also
be appropriate. In such a case, it may well be that the plaintiff competes in the
marketplace so that the defendant's infringement creates irreparable harm to the
plaintiff for which a compensatory monetary award cannot be satisfactorily cal-
culated.265 In a case like this, the court has essentially said that the public good
should permit defendant's continued infringement, so the court will likely want
to set the royalty at a rate that retains defendant's incentive to produce (that is,
that leaves the product profitable) but that, subject to that limitation, compensates
the patentee as much as possible.266 Injunction denials on the basis of the public
interest arise most often in the medical field.267
3. Ongoing Royalties and Infringer Incentives
One might worry that an ongoing royalty at only the compensatory rate
permits the infringer to exercise a form of private eminent domain, taking the
patentee's right to exclude at the objective market value. As the Sixth Circuit put
it long ago,
[t]he setting of a reasonable royalty after infringement cannot be
treated, as it was here, as the equivalent of ordinary royalty nego-
tiations among truly 'willing' patent owners and licensees. That
view would constitute a pretense that the infringement never hap-
pened. It would also make an election to infringe a handy means
for competitors to impose a 'compulsory license' policy upon
every patent owner.268
264 No. 6:10-CV-23, 2013 WL 4056282, at *21 (E.D. Tex. June 19, 2013), aff'd, 575 F. App'x
895 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
265 See Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 670 F.3d 1171, 1192 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (district court appropriately awarded higher ongoing royalty for certain infringing prod-
ucts where patentee directly competed with infringer), aff'd inpart, vacated in part, 682 F.3d 1003
(Fed. Cir. 2012), and 476 F. App'x 747 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (reh "g en banc granted).
266 See, e.g., Bard, 670 F.3d 1171 (injunction denied for medical devices on public interest
grounds, but reasonable royalty enhanced beyond jury award).
267 See supra notes 138-139.
268 Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 1978).
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This concern has been well-developed in the context of real property,
such as in trespass cases. In trespass cases, for example, Pomeroy recognized
that "[t]o deny the injunction is... to allow the wrong-doer to compel innocent
persons to sell their right at a valuation, and to refuse him altogether any equita-
ble relief in a case where, on the ground of avoiding multiplicity of suits at
least,.., his injury may be irreparable. 269 But Pomeroy answered that objection
by pointing out "that a willful trespasser cannot in this way acquire an inch of
land, because the mandatory injunction must issue as to him ....
Although we may prefer to avoid the initial infringement where possible,
the denial of injunctive relief is often premised on the absence of significant cul-
pability on the part of the infringer in undertaking the infringing conduct. If the
infringer acted willfully, recklessly, or, in some formulations, even negligently,
the court would not balance the hardships from an injunction, and would instead
likely grant the injunction.271 Thus, setting ongoing royalties at the unenhanced
rate should not increase incentives to infringe. Because additional damages or an
injunction would not significantly prevent a similar occurrence in the future, or
would do so by creating excessive search costs, 272 there is nothing to punish or
deter, and damages for the trespass are appropriately assessed at market value.
Other incentive-based concerns have been described in the ongoing roy-
alty context. The Paice court stated, and several courts have since reiterated,273
that "[flailing to consider the parties' changed legal status would create an in-
centive for every defendant to fight each patent infringement case to the bitter
end because without consideration of the changed legal status, there is essentially
no downside to losing. 274 The concern is that defendants, by simply paying after
269 5 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES
854 (3d ed. 1905).
270 Id. at 855-56 (quoting Goldbacher v. Eggers, 76 N.Y.S. 881, 885 (N.Y. 1902)). To the ex-
tent that, post-eBay, Pomeroy's answer does not hold true-that is, that even an intentional wrong-
doer can avoid the injunction on the ground that the plaintiff's legal remedy is adequate-enhance-
ment could be warranted in such cases. See supra notes 263-264.
271 See Dobbs, supra note 71, at 367 (to prevent private eminent domain, injunction should be
granted "in any case in which the defendant intentionally builds a portion of his building upon the
plaintiffs land," and it "should operate as a strong factor against the defendant if he negligently
builds across the line").
272 In many cases, for example, the trespassing party relies on surveys. Perhaps multiple sur-
veys would have avoided the issue, but that cost will be wasted in the vast majority of circum-
stances, in which the first survey accurately depicts property boundaries. Similarly, an exhaustive
search of the patent records and extensive consultation with counsel might identify infringed pa-
tents before a product is released, but such precautions are impractical and prohibitively expensive,
and would create significant delays.
273 See, e.g., Telcordia Tech., Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. CV 04-876-GMS, 2014 WL 1457797,
at *4 (D. Del. Apr. 14, 2014).
274 Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 620, 628 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
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litigation what they would have paid before litigation, or in the absence of litiga-
tion, will have no incentive to settle. "For that reason, courts frequently impose
a post-verdict ongoing royalty rate that is higher than the reasonable royalty
found at trial for past infringement. 275
But that assumes that the jury did not, in fact, conduct the hypothetical
negotiation on the assumption that the parties knew that the patents were valid
and infringed. If the reasonable royalty rate set by the jury for past damages was
properly set, then defendants have an incentive to settle based on litigation un-
certainty and litigation costs. In the end, because the reasonable royalty should
not reflect a patent strength discount, the reasonable royalty should be set at a
level higher than what the infringer could have taken a license for pre-litiga-
276tion.
It is possible that courts believe that the equities require denying injunc-
tive relief because of immediate harm to the defendant from the injunction, but
that the defendant could costlessly or cheaply switch to a non-infringing alterna-
tive over time. The enhanced ongoing royalty might be a way of encouraging the
defendant to opt for the noninfringing alternative over time. But, if that were the
case, it would be better to award either an injunction with a sunset period of
royalties at the reasonable royalty rate, or to award an escalating ongoing royalty
that starts out at the reasonable royalty (that is, compensatory) rate and increases
over time during the life of the patent.277
4. Deterrence and Market Incentives Revisited
Perhaps, despite all of the forward-looking talk about the need to en-
hance the ongoing royalty based on the willfulness of future infringement, courts
enhancing ongoing royalties are actually, if unconsciously, basing the enhance-
ment on the infringer's pre-suit conduct and the incentives created thereby.278
275 Telcordia, 2014 WL 1457797, at *4; see also id. at *5 ("Further, the court agrees with
Telcordia that the interests ofjustice would not be served if Cisco was afforded an ongoing royalty
under the same favorable terms as a voluntary licensee.").
276 See John D. Taurman, The Reasonable Royalty for Patent Infringement Theory and Prac-
tice, INTELL. PROP. L. NEWSL., Spring 2005, at 16, 19.
277 See Transamerica Life Ins. Co. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 691 F. Supp. 2d 946, 954
(N.D. Iowa 2010) (describing prior injunction with escalating royalty rates); Shiley, Inc. v. Bentley
Labs., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 964 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (entering injunction with six-month sunset period
involving an escalating royalty, starting at the jury award for the first two months and increasing
thereafter), aff'd, 794 F.2d 1591 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also Sandrik, supra note 11, at 146. Of
course, this kind of award would require the court to engage in some predictions about the likely
future of the defendant's products and the market, but an ongoing royalty requires such predictions
as well. And they require less prediction a lump-sum award for future damages, which also requires
the fact-finder to speculate about the number of products the defendant is likely to sell, and at what
price.
278 See generally Matthew S. Levine, Punishment and Willingness to Pay, 40 GONz. L. REV.
329, 336 (2005) (discussing punitive damages to remedy underdeterrence).
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Specifically, there may be concerns about the defendant's front-end patent clear-
ance; perhaps the defendant's negligence in failing to discover the patent was not
so great as to warrant injunctive relief and the harms that it would entail, but
perhaps the defendant should have conducted a better patent search, or taken
more precautions against infringement. Thus, fear of an injunction might para-
lyze innovators to an inefficient degree (causing them to over-search), whereas
a moderately-enhanced ongoing royalty might not result in this paralysis.
Remember that the defendant's front-end activities, such as recklessly
ignoring indications of infringement or, perhaps, conducting an insufficient
clearance search, are taken into account under the rubric of intentionality and
balancing the parties' hardships. For a court to award enhanced damages for an
insufficient front-end search, the court must conclude that the defendant's con-
duct is culpable, but not so culpable as to warrant injunctive relief. This is con-
sistent with the idea stated in mistaken improver cases that courts considering an
equitable disposition should take account of the degree of negligence involved
on the part of the improver. 279 But, again, even in these cases, the result has not
been awarding title or an easement to the improver at an above-market rate-the
improver is uniformly required to pay only market value.28°
Full treatment of the merits of this rationale for enhancement would re-
quire a separate discussion-indeed, the level of patent searches (clearance costs)
that the patent system should require has been the subject of extensive and varied
commentary. 281 But, if that is the rationale for the enhancement of the ongoing
royalty, courts have misdirected their attentions by emphasizing the "willful"
nature of the defendant's continued infringement. Instead, the courts should have
282focused on the insufficient nature of the defendant's clearance activities.
279 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 10 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST.
2011) ("[T]he degree of care exercised by the mistaken improver is better described as a factor
relevant to loss allocation."); see also Raab v. Casper, 124 Cal. Rptr. 590, 593-94 (Cal. Ct. App.
1975) (discussing California betterment statute that, "[w]ithout evoking conventional choices be-
tween ordinary and gross negligence.., invites consideration of varying intensities of negli-
gence").
280 See supra note 227.
281 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1614 (2003) (arguing that patent law must permit the quick and easy clearance of overlap-
ping patent rights); John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REv. 505, 565
(2010) (discussing clearance costs and noting that "even a remedies regime lacking injunctions can
encourage clearance"); Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, 68
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 289, 317 (2012) (arguing that patent clearance is largely impossible).
282 See Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property
Rights, 106 MICH. L. REv. 1285, 1307 (2008) (arguing that liability rules avoid incentive to conduct
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91283Enhanced damages are generally "reserved for egregious cases,
which is presumably a higher degree of culpability than a merely negligent clear-
ance search.284 Thus, it might seem inconsistent to allow enhancement of the on-
going royalty on the basis of the defendant's clearance search. On the other hand,
the Federal Circuit's willfulness precedent largely arose at a time when an in-
junction against post-judgment infringement was all but certain.285 Fear of in-
junctions offered significant incentive for parties who were heavily investing in
a technology to undertake reasonable patent clearance; the specter of an injunc-
tion resulting in wasted investments would prompt some level of diligence prior
to the investments. Perhaps allowing enhancement of ongoing royalties for
something less than willfulness would permit courts to retain patent clearance
incentives even in cases where injunctive relief will not be available.286
To the extent that enhancement is designed to promote patent clearance
incentives, it suggests that courts believe that the infringer could have located the
patent, determined validity and infringement, and negotiated a license in advance
with relatively low transaction costs,2 87 or perhaps it suggests a moral judgment
about the level of the infringer's disregard of the property rights of others.288 But,
if these considerations form the core concerns of courts enhancing ongoing roy-
alties, courts should jettison the talk of willful infringement. Instead, courts
should candidly acknowledge the focus on search incentives, so that they can
attempt to create a remedies regime that will set incentives appropriately.
V. CONCLUSION
It is time for courts to systematically evaluate the proper level of ongoing
royalties. The current practices have resulted in disparate awards, with some
courts concluding that ongoing royalties should be set at compensatory levels 289
283 Halo Elecs. Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933-34 (2016).
284 Marc Hubbard & Jennifer Brooks, The Effect of Seagate on Patent Infringement Risk Man-
agement Strategies, 22 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Mar. 2010, at 1, 2-3.
285 See supra Part I.A. But see In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (im-
portant willfulness precedent decided just after eBay).
286 That said, because the manufacturer will not know until after it conducts a clearance search
or is accused of infringement whether a particular patentee is likely to be able to obtain injunctive
relief or merely an ongoing royalty, the marginal clearance incentives provided by enhanced on-
going royalties may be relatively small.
287 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 113, at 1126-27.
288 See id. at 1102-03. Remember that what matters here is the infringer's action when there
are not yet significant switching costs--once switching costs enter the picture, patentee holdout
becomes a potential problem, and Calabresi and Melamed's concerns may call for "nonaccidental
and unconsented taking of an entitlement" at market value. Id. at 1127.
289 See, e.g., Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., No. 09-290, 2014 WL
1320154, at *38-39 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2014), ajfdin part, vacated in part, 807 F.3d 1283 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (but the court affirmed the ongoing royalty).
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ENHANCED ONGOING ROYALTIES
and other courts setting ongoing royalties at supracompensatory levels.29 ° In this
Article, I have attempted to frame the ongoing royalty award by examining the
reasons that injunctive relief may be denied, and the reasons for awarding ongo-
ing royalties over the alternatives, such as a lump-sum award or leaving future
infringement to future litigation. In the process, I have highlighted remedial prin-
ciples developed from analogous traditional-property contexts.
I have argued that, in many cases, injunctions are denied because of con-
cems about the potential hardship on a relatively innocent defendant, who would
incur significant switching costs as the result of an injunction. These situations
create the potential for patentee opportunism. I have also argued that ongoing
royalties help to create certainty in order for both parties to order their affairs
going forward and that they are less likely than lump-sum awards to over- or
under-compensate the patentee.
Where these concerns drive the ongoing royalty award, compensatory
awards will suffice. Where ongoing royalties serve as the patent laws' equivalent
to a forced transaction in an encroachment case-that is, where the innocent in-
fringer has inadvertently "built" a product that encroaches slightly on the pa-
tentee's property (such as where the patented invention is a small component of
a larger product)-there is no reason to award supracompensatory ongoing roy-
alties. In fact, most of the reasons that courts have offered for awarding su-
pracompensatory ongoing royalties, such as the "willfulness" of future infringe-
ment-do not withstand scrutiny.
In most cases, courts should award only compensatory ongoing royal-
ties. Nevertheless, there may be times in which supracompensatory awards are
appropriate. One such example would be cases in which the infringer engaged in
intentional misconduct before incurring significant prospective switching costs.
Another example may be a case in which the court believes that the infringer's
inadequate pre-infringement patent clearance activities prevented the parties
from reaching a negotiated license. But, in these cases, courts should recognize
and articulate their true reasons for heightened awards, so that a proper remedial
system may be developed.
290 See, e.g., Morpho Detection, Inc. v. Smiths Detection, Inc., No. 2:11 CV498, 2013 WL
5701522, at *8 (E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2013); DataTreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 2:06-CV-
72 DF, 2011 WL 8810604, at *19 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2,2011).
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